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Pandora’s Loot Box
Sheldon A. Evans*
ABSTRACT
The emerging trend of loot boxes in video game platforms continues to
expand the shifting boundaries between the real and virtual world and
presents unique insights into the impact each world should have on the other.
Borrowing their design from the gambling industry, loot boxes operate as a
hybrid between slot machines and trading cards. A consumer pays real-world
money to buy a virtual box without knowing its contents. Upon opening the
box, the consumer receives a virtual good that may be of great value, but more
commonly is of little or no value.
This Article contributes a novel theory of virtual valuation that reframes
how we should think about loot boxes, but also more generally about the influence that virtual goods have in the real world. Scholars have presented differing views regarding the ownership, sale, and taxation of virtual goods, but
have always relied upon virtual goods’ real-world value to determine their
real-world significance. This Article rejects this dominant value construct by
tailoring the economic principal of perceived value for the virtual world. By
valuing a virtual good based on the perceived benefit it can bring in the virtual
world—irrespective of any real-world value—it becomes clear that consumers
are driven to gamble for virtual goods in loot boxes based on the potential
prizes’ perceived value. Using this new framework, this Article argues that loot
boxes should be regulated similarly to the gambling industry they mimic. After
considering the policy ramifications of loot box regulation, this Article concludes by exploring the contribution that perceived virtual value can have in
the many legal contexts that also rely upon the value of virtual goods to determine real-world significance.
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INTRODUCTION
The virtual world is a frontier unlike any other because it is both
interlaced yet simultaneously separate from the real world. Whether it
comes by exploring alien worlds in video games, sharing likes with
friends on social media, or navigating a digital library of content, interactions with people and things inside the virtual world have real
impact. For one, while most of the planet accesses the virtual world
for entertainment, social, and business purposes, scholars have been
discussing how virtual goods—which are assets that exist solely in the
virtual world—should be valuated in the real world.1 The ramifica1 See, e.g., Joseph Macey & Juho Hamari, eSports, Skins and Loot Boxes: Participants,
Practices and Problematic Behaviour Associated with Emergent Forms of Gambling, 21 NEW
MEDIA & SOC’Y 20, 22 (2019).
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tions of this debate are legion and have tremendous impact on how we
think about property, family, taxes, government benefits, and more.
The growing trend of loot boxes in the video game industry offers
unique insight into these questions. Loot boxes are a mix between
pulling a slot machine lever and buying a pack of trading cards. Players spend real-world money to buy a virtual box without knowing its
contents.2 Thus, the player engages in this game of chance with the
hopes that the virtual good inside the box is valuable. The concept of
value in the virtual world, however, is underappreciated and undertheorized. While real-world scholars, courts, and government agencies assess real-world value before exploring commensurate policy
responses, this Article rejects that dominant value construct by contributing a new theory of virtual valuation.3 By tailoring the economic
theory of perceived value to apply to virtual goods, this Article argues
that loot boxes should be regulated as a gambling activity. This contribution of perceived virtual value has ramifications throughout the virtual and real worlds, which this Article further explores as the virtual
frontier continues to expand.
The subject of virtual worlds4 is vast, but this Article focuses on
the loot box phenomena as a gateway to understand and appreciate
the importance of perceived value when assessing virtual goods and
other virtual assets generally. Loot boxes specifically have grown in
the virtual worlds presented in video games, which is one of the fastest
growing industries in the world.5 The video game industry boasts a
multi-billion-member player base and revenues that have already
overtaken other traditional entertainment mediums such as sports,
movies, and music combined.6
The universal appeal of virtual worlds and the video games within
becomes apparent when contrasted with these other forms of traditional entertainment and expression. Virtual worlds have become a
dominant medium of entertainment of this generation7 because of
2 See Aaron Drummond & James D. Sauer, Video Game Loot Boxes are Psychologically
Akin to Gambling, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 530, 530 (2018).
3 See Macey & Hamari, supra note 1, at 26.
4 This Article appreciates multiple concepts of the virtual world. There is the concept of
one virtual world that exists via the internet, but this one virtual world can also be separated into
several uniquely different worlds that are owned and accessed by different consumers.
5 See generally Katie Jones, Online Gaming: The Rise of a Multi-Billion Dollar Industry,
VISUAL CAPITALIST (July 15, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/online-gaming-the-rise-ofa-multi-billion-dollar-industry/ [https://perma.cc/T5TC-R2XX] (discussing growth by revenues of
industry as a whole as well as growth of subsets of the video game industry).
6 See infra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
7 See Peter Zackariasson & Timothy L. Wilson, Introduction, in THE VIDEO GAME IN-
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their interactive ability to teach us, shape our moods, and create new
habits.8 People escape into virtual worlds for a number of different
reasons, such as pursuing heroic narratives that build a sense of selfworth and accomplishment, toggling along a spectrum of identity and
expression, and socializing with friends in team-building events, all of
which are uniquely different than similar opportunities presented in
the real world.9 People live in virtual worlds,10 enough for some to
claim citizenship there.11 People love in virtual worlds, enough for
them to get married there.12 People die in virtual worlds, enough for
crimes to be charged there.13 Spending time in virtual worlds is no
longer the stereotypical pastime of teenagers,14 but has expanded exponentially into the living rooms, computers, and pockets of nearly
DUSTRY 1, 1 (Peter Zackariasson & Timothy L. Wilson eds., 2012) (describing video games as
“one of the major media we interact with during the course of a day”); Dan L. Burk, Owning ESports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1535–36
(2013) (describing the expanding market of video games as “[o]ne of the most astounding and
largely underappreciated developments accompanying the recent proliferation of mass-market
computer technology”).

8 See, e.g., Joseph Macey & Juho Hamari, Investigating Relationships Between Video
Gaming, Spectating eSports, and Gambling, 80 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 344, 344–45, 350 (2018)
(outlining research showing associations between video games, aggressive behavior, and substance abuse); YU-KAI CHOU, ACTIONABLE GAMIFICATION 129 (2016) (describing a study showing that those who played certain video games exhibited improved memory, visual, and
information filtering abilities).
9 See JANE MCGONIGAL, REALITY IS BROKEN: WHY GAMES MAKE US BETTER AND
HOW THEY CAN CHANGE THE WORLD 4 (2011) (arguing that video games offer genuine human
fulfillment in ways that the real world cannot).
10 See Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck, Introduction, in THE STATE OF PLAY 3, 3
(Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006) (noting that many gamers spend more time
in the virtual world than in the real world).
11 See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A Primer, in THE STATE OF
PLAY, supra note 10, at 13, 16; see also GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 79–87 (2010) (citing
arguments of scholars for why internet and virtual worlds should be their own jurisdiction for
legal purposes).
12 See LASTOWKA, supra note 11, at 29–30 (describing a couple who got married in both
the real and virtual world).
13 See, e.g., id. at 122–23 (describing Dutch and South Korean authorities using criminal
law to punish virtual property theft and fraud); ‘Virtual Theft’ Leads to Arrest, BBC NEWS (Nov.
14, 2007, 2:37 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7094764.stm [https://perma.cc/6APH4PR9] (reporting that Dutch courts charged theft of virtual goods as if it were real-world property); Cao Li, Death Sentence for Online Gamer, CHINA DAILY (June 8, 2005), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/08/content_449600.htm [https://perma.cc/TQU2H3R9] (describing a crime in which a Chinese gamer murdered another player over the theft of
a virtual good because there was no legitimate legal redress otherwise).
14 See JASON SCHREIER, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND PIXELS, at XV (2017) (discussing the transformation of video gamers from the stereotypical teenager to a broader gaming demographic).
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one-third of the planet.15 So even for those that do not consider themselves to be gamers, chances are they know somebody who does.
But even imaginary virtual worlds need to establish a baseline of
reality to effectively engage their audience. Video game developers
achieve this by designing intricate virtual economies that run on many
of the same traditional economic principles that govern real-world
economies.16 For example, virtual worlds have a familiar work-to-reward ratio in which rare and valuable virtual goods require a commensurate amount of player effort to obtain.17 This investment of time is
one of the things that makes virtual goods so valuable to players.18
People have been killed over virtual goods.19 Companies have been
sued over virtual goods.20 People make a living from transacting with
virtual goods.21 Appreciating this value judgment of players and an
entire industry is yet another important aspect of how the real world
and virtual world mirror and impact each other.
This is what gives loot boxes their allure; they give players the
opportunity to short-circuit this gameplay loop by paying real-world
money for the chance of winning a valuable virtual good—or “loot” as
many players call it. But just like pulling the lever on a slot machine or
playing the lottery, players have a better chance of being hit by virtual
lightning22 than winning top-tier virtual goods in a loot box.23 This is
by design and is meant to entice players to spend more real-world
money to open loot boxes for the marginal chances of attaining valuable virtual goods, borrowing from the same strategies to exploit physi15 See Ilker Koksal, Video Gaming Industry & Its Revenue Shift, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2019,
5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilkerkoksal/2019/11/08/video-gaming-industry—its-revenue-shift/ [https://perma.cc/6LG2-RHU3].
16 See Thomas Malaby, Parlaying Value: Capital in and Beyond Virtual Worlds, 1 GAMES
& CULTURE 141, 145 (2006).
17 See id. at 150 (discussing how the assessment of value of virtual goods is correlated to
the amount of time spent in the virtual world to obtain them).
18

See id.

19

See Li, supra note 13.

See Josh Ye, Tencent Tells Chinese Court It Owns All Virtual Coins, Other Merchandise
Acquired by Players in Its Video Games, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 3, 2021, 9:07 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3132123/tencent-tells-chinese-court-it-owns-all-virtual-coins-other [https://perma.cc/3WJX-4C4N].
20

21 Cf. LASTOWKA, supra note 11, at 122–23 (describing Dutch and South Korean authorities using criminal law to punish virtual property theft and fraud).
22 Unless you have virtual goods like metal weapons or armor during a thunderstorm in
The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild.
23 See Andrew V. Moshirnia, Precious and Worthless: A Comparative Perspective on Loot
Boxes and Gambling, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 77, 87 (2019).
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cal and psychological triggers as gambling mechanics.24 Because these
items carry so much value in the virtual world, players are willing to
compulsively spend real-world money for the chance to obtain desired
virtual goods.25
Designing loot boxes to trigger the same responses as gambling
activities also produces the same negative externalities that gambling
regulations seek to curb. Children, for example, are targeted by the
video game industry to purchase these loot boxes and other online
content.26 People who have developed problem gambling behaviors
have also been targeted by developers. Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is
used to identify “whales” and high spenders to extract as much revenue from them as possible by encouraging and advertising loot box
spending.27 This explains why there are hundreds of anecdotal stories
across the internet of children and adults selling their possessions,
stealing credit cards from parents, and even contemplating suicide28 to
cope with and support their unhealthy loot box habit. When consumer
predation becomes a business model, consumer protection tools become a necessary bulwark.
Policy makers and courts, however, have yet to catch up to the
virtual world and the loot boxes therein. Legal definitions of gambling
vary across jurisdictions, but all define it with similar strokes: the activity must include (1) offering consideration (2) to play a game of

24

See id. at 87–88 (describing several similarities between loot boxes and slot machines).

25

See id. at 80–81.

See, e.g., Marisa Meyer, Victoria Adkins, Nalingna Yuan, Heidi M. Weeks, Yung-Ju
Chang & Jenny Radesky, Advertising in Young Children’s Apps: A Content Analysis, 40 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 32, 34–36 (2019) (describing advertising and other strategies that encourage and deceive children to spend more money on microtransactions).
26

27 See Alex Walker, Someone Spent Over $150,000 in Microtransactions on a Transformers
Game, KOTAKU (Oct. 14, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://kotaku.com/someone-spent-over-150-000-inmicrotransactions-on-a-t-1839040151 [https://perma.cc/5C9X-RGXJ] (detailing AI technology
that identifies whales with 87% accuracy); see also Mark D. Griffiths, Online Gambling and
Geolocation Technology: Implications for Regulation and Potential Threats to Player Protection,
23 GAMING L. REV. 344, 346 (2019) (describing gambling industry use of big data to track customer spending habits).
28 See Shaun Assael, Skin in the Game, ESPN (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.espn.com/espn/
feature/story/_/id/18510975/how-counter-strike-turned-teenager-compulsive-gambler [https://
perma.cc/885Z-ZPBZ] (detailing story of sixteen-year-old Elijah Ballard who sold his iPad and
stole money from his parents to support his habit of gambling with virtual goods); Ellen McGrody, For Many Players, Lootboxes Are a Crisis That’s Already Here, VICE (Jan. 30, 2018, 2:08
PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/kznmwa/for-many-players-lootboxes-are-a-crisis-thats-already-here [https://perma.cc/F8EN-BD77] (interviewing player with suicidal ideations from
overspending on virtual goods).
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chance (3) to win a prize.29 The “prize” element is where virtual goods
get lost in the shuffle. Many courts have interpreted the prize element
to only include things of “value,” and value is often interpreted narrowly to mean real-world or fair-market value.30 Under this precedent—adopted well before the digital age—such prizes of value could
include money, vacations, cars, and many other valuable goods.31
Thus, a prize only has sufficient value if it can be readily exchanged
for real-world money to allow players the ability to cash out. This aspect of the prize/value element—referred to as the “cash-out” rule—
likely means that buying and selling loot boxes would not be categorized as gambling activity because most virtual worlds do not allow
players to “cash out” by selling or exchanging their virtual goods for
real-world money.
The cash-out rule has proven to be the decisive legal distinction
in how different countries address the loot box pandemic.32 New Zealand, Denmark, and Ireland—despite impaneling multiple legislative
committees and commissioning expert reports—have not classified
loot boxes as a gambling activity because of the cash-out rule.33 Other
countries have been more responsive. The Netherlands and Belgium
have taken the strong stance of banning loot boxes entirely because of
their gambling-like design,34 while parliamentary committees in the
29

See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 2 (2021) (describing elements of gambling through state

survey).
See infra Part II.
See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
32 See Moshirnia, supra note 23, at 99–107 (outlining domestic and international response
in regulating loot boxes); see also Emma Kent, 15 European Gambling Regulators Unite to
Tackle Loot Box Threat, EUROGAMER (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/201809-17-15-european-gambling-regulators-unite-to-tackle-loot-box-threat [https://perma.cc/ST4LAKDR] (describing important steps taken by European countries and Washington State to investigate and regulate loot boxes). See generally Daniel Cermak, Note, Micro-Transactions, Massive Headaches: International Regulation of Video Game Loot Boxes, 28 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L.
INT’L L. REV. 273 (2020) (comparing international regulatory responses to loot boxes).
33 See Katherine Cross, New Zealand Says Lootboxes ‘Do Not Meet the Legal Definition
for Gambling,’ GAME DEV. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/311463/
New_Zealand_says_lootboxes_do_not_meet_the_legal_definition_for_gambling.php [https://
perma.cc/JZ9T-6HH9] (describing same for New Zealand); Government Shies Away from
Crackdown on ‘Loot Box’ Games, IRISH LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://
www.irishlegal.com/article/government-shies-away-from-crackdown-on-loot-box-games [https://
perma.cc/4FY4-HBUR] (describing same for Ireland); Rune Kristian Lundedal Nielsen & Pawel
Grabarczyk, Are Loot Boxes Gambling?, 4 TRANSACTIONS DIGIT. GAMES RSCH. ASS’N 171, 191
(2019) (explaining Danish decision that loot box rewards that “cannot easily be exchanged for
money” are not considered gambling).
34 BELG. GAMING COMM’N, RESEARCH REPORT ON LOOT BOXES 16 (2018), https://gamingcommission.be/sites/default/files/2021-08/onderzoeksrapport-loot-boxen-Engels-publicatie.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q72-YNTG] (finding that paid loot boxes observed in most popular
30
31

2022]

PANDORA’S LOOT BOX

383

United Kingdom have issued recommendations to regulate loot boxes
as gambling activities.35 China and South Korea have taken swift action to try to demonetize virtual goods and currencies, making it
harder for players to exchange these virtual assets for real-world
money.36 And yet, the United States—one of the biggest markets for
video games37 and a global leader in game production—has remained
silent. While there have been some state-level inquiries38 and even a
bipartisan bill introduced in Congress,39 these efforts have had little
impact in this burgeoning virtual world.
This Article proposes an appropriate expansion of how courts,
and later regulators, should think about valuating virtual goods.
Drawing from economic and social science theories that measure consumer consumption, this Article argues that consumers desire virtual
goods based on their perceived value; this includes the social, expressive, and utility value these goods have in the virtual world. What the
antiquated cash-out rule fails to account for is that money and value
are different but related concepts. The former is merely one of many
ways to assess the latter. The real-world market value of a virtual
good is less significant to players when compared to what that virtual
good can do to enhance the player’s virtual experience. For example,
attaining a rare virtual good can signal status and skill in the virtual
games like Overwatch, FIFA 2018, and Counter-Strike: Global Offensive fit the legal description
of gambling under the Belgium Gaming and Betting Act); NETH. GAMBLING AUTH., GUIDE ON
ASSESSING GAMES OF CHANCE (2018), https://www.mygamecounsel.com/wp-content/uploads/
sites/32/2018/04/guide_on_assessing_games_of_chance.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG5C-3ZCE] (same
corresponding to Article 1 of the Netherlands’ Betting and Gaming Act).
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GAMBLING INDUSGAMBLING HARM—TIME FOR ACTION, 2019–21, HL-79, at 115 (UK) (recommending that
legislatures regulate loot boxes under United Kingdom’s Gambling Act of 2005).
35

TRY,

VILI LEHDONVIRTA & MIRKO ERNKVIST, KNOWLEDGE MAP OF THE VIRTUAL ECON18–19 (2011) (describing efforts of China, South Korea, and Vietnam to create legislation
and act through central banks to curb negative social and economic effects of commodifying
virtual goods). See MCGONIGAL, supra note 9, at 2–3.
36

OMY

37 U.S. Games Market 2018, NEWZOO (Aug. 1, 2018), https://newzoo.com/insights/info
graphics/us-games-market-2018/ [https://perma.cc/44LZ-D24X] (reporting that the U.S. gaming
market is second in the world).
38 See S. 6266, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); H.R. 2686, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ha.
2018); H.R. 2727, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ha. 2018); S. 3024, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ha. 2018); S.
3025, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ha. 2018); Assemb. 2194, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); H.R.
4460, 90th Leg., 19th Sess. (Minn. 2018); see also S. ENV’T & COMMC’NS REFERENCES COMM.,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., GAMING MICRO-TRANSACTIONS FOR CHANCE-BASED ITEMS 14 (2018)
[hereinafter AUSTL. SENATE REPORT] (noting that none of these bills have passed in respective
state legislatures).
39

Protecting Children from Abusive Games Act, S. 1629, 116th Cong. (2019).
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world because of the work-to-reward ratio.40 Virtual goods can also be
used as models of expression, especially if they bring aesthetic enjoyment and hedonic pleasure to the player and others. And virtual
goods have tremendous utility value that helps empower players to
overcome obstacles in the virtual world.41 It is this perceived value
that entices players to buy loot boxes for the rare chance of winning a
virtual prize that has virtual value.42
This new framework of perceived virtual valuation offers several
new insights into how we regulate the rotating door in which money
and value flow between the real and virtual worlds. In the gambling
context, this Article argues that state gambling laws and courts should
adopt this more accurate view of perceived virtual value when assessing the prize/value element in loot box litigation. But beyond loot
boxes and gambling regulation, should this perceived virtual value be
taken into account when assessing assets to be divided in divorce
cases, determining child support, or alimony? Should bankruptcy
courts start valuating the virtual assets of debtors? Could this new valuation tool be used to negatively affect students applying for government aid and scholarships, or even those applying for other needbased government benefits such as welfare? These important considerations beg the following question: does the new framework of perceived virtual value close one pandora’s box (by regulating gambling
mechanics in video games) only to open another? This Article humbly
answers in the negative. All of the aforementioned asset-based determinations rely upon real-world value, which this Article’s framework
specifically separates from perceived virtual value. While perceived
virtual value is incredibly relevant to help explain why consumers
enter into gambling transactions in the virtual world, it is not able to
assess the real-world value of assets in other legal contexts. Only realworld markets can do that. Nevertheless, perceived virtual value may
still serve as an important component in some of these other contexts,
especially as a powerful bargaining tool in adversarial negotiations.
See, e.g., Moshirnia, supra note 23, at 89.
See Bryan Wirtz, Pay to Win Games Are Taking Over: How Much Are You Willing to
Pay?, GAMEDESIGNING (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.gamedesigning.org/gaming/pay-to-wingames/ [https://perma.cc/N5KJ-UGT7] (discussing how purchasing virtual goods can give players
a competitive advantage).
42 Loot boxes and their overlap with gambling law is understudied in American legal
academia, with the exception of a handful of scholars and student notes. See, e.g., Moshirnia,
supra note 23, at 87–88; Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 129, 131–32, 144, 156–59, 164–66 (2019) (discussing addictive technologies, such as loot
boxes and social media software design); Edwin Hong, Note, Loot Boxes: Gambling for the Next
Generation, 46 W. ST. L. REV. 61 (2019).
40
41
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Although the concept of perceived value is not new to social science literature, grafting it into a novel valuation framework for virtual
goods finds a natural affinity because of the unique setting of virtual
worlds. It is precisely because the virtual and real worlds are separate—yet overlapping—that there is still a divide between value in the
real world versus value in the virtual world. By filling this gap, this
Article expands the use of perceived value as an economic tool while
also contributing to the growing literature on the impact of the virtual
world and growing predatory trends in the technology industry.43
This Article does so in five parts. Parts I–III answer the outstanding legal question of whether loot boxes can and should be considered
gambling. Part I starts this analysis by exploring the depth of virtual
worlds and their economies. By detailing the mechanics of loot boxes
against the backdrop of perceived virtual value, the scope of the problem and potential solutions are properly contextualized. Part II continues by overlaying the existing structures of state gambling laws, and
explains why current laws do not properly account for virtual goods.
Analyzing the limited case law dealing with trading cards and virtual
rewards establishes the limits of courts’ understanding of value. Part
III brings the preceding parts together, analyzing why loot boxes can
and should be considered as a gambling activity when properly accounting for perceived value. But declaring loot boxes as a gambling
activity is merely one part of solving the puzzle.
Part IV answers the practical regulatory questions of what then
should be done, while also considering nuances and potential unintended consequences. By probing traditional frameworks for regulation, this Part advocates for a new set of regulatory tools uniquely
tailored to combat the specific harms of loot boxes. This Part goes
beyond the role of courts and regulators, but instead provides for multiple interventions and partnerships distributed among private and
public actors. Part V continues this discussion by considering the impacts of perceived virtual value outside of the gambling and loot box
context. While there is a danger in expanding virtual value too far, this
Part concludes the Article by offering assurances that virtual value
does not threaten the existing real-world valuation order. Rather, it
enhances the existing valuation order to properly account for and regulate predatory practices in the virtual world that have been ignored
for too long. Given the tremendous impact at stake with the unregu43 See infra notes 328–29 and accompanying text (examining well-documented critiques of
social media companies like Facebook and YouTube for designing addictive products and
services).
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lated gambling activity of loot boxes and other predatory practices,
exploring this aspect of virtual worlds is indeed a new legal frontier.
I. EXPLORING VIRTUAL VALUE

IN THE

WORLDS

OF

GAMING

The dream has become their reality. Who are you to say
otherwise . . . ?
—Inception44
The irony of exploring virtual worlds is that it starts with the reality of human experience. Players that access these virtual worlds necessarily bring a piece of their humanity with them. With such
humanity must also come a modicum of rights, privileges, and protections in these virtual worlds. This rotating door between the real and
virtual worlds undergirds longstanding debates within the scholarly
and business community about the optimal level of impact the real
world should have on the virtual world. Central to this discussion is
the penetrability of the “magic circle.” This concept was first discussed
by game theorist Johan Huizinga to describe the veil of make-believe
that keeps the game world separate from the real world.45 One of the
seminal debates of the law’s relation to the magic circle included adverse positions from economist Edward Castronova and legal scholar
Jack Balkin. Castronova has argued that the law should play a role in
protecting the magic circle by making it impenetrable from outside
legal interference.46 Balkin, however, rightfully recognized that as
more people invest more time and real-world money in virtual worlds,
real-world law would have to seep in, if for nothing else, to protect
basic human rights among other things.47 Other scholars have supplemented this debate, arguing that the laws of the real world must pene-

INCEPTION (Legendary Pictures 2010).
See J. HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS 10–11 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1949).
46 See Balkin & Noveck, supra note 10, at 6; Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, in
THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 10, at 68, 83–85.
47 Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note
10, at 86, 88–94 (explaining various permeable aspects of the magic circle and the integration of
real-world issues into virtual worlds).
44
45
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trate the magic circle to consider human rights,48 property rights,49
criminal regulation,50 and even taxation of virtual economies.51
This Part provides a tutorial backdrop to introduce the rules of
virtual economies, theories of virtual valuation, and the reasons why
real-world value is significantly different from virtual value. It explores why virtual ownership, use, and profit inform that unique valuation question. This Part concludes by integrating these principles
with the theoretical contribution of the Article, which relies on economic and social science literature to show that virtual goods are valuable in the virtual world irrespective and wholly apart from any
corresponding real-world value. This new theory of virtual value,
which relies on the economic principle of perceived value, is central to
solving the loot box problem by fully appreciating why consumers are
so willing to compulsively gamble for virtual goods.
A. Virtual Economics: Virtual Value to Developers
The importance of virtual worlds cannot be overstated. Video
game industry analysts estimate that 2.5 billion players populate virtual worlds, and industry giants seek to increase this player base to
seven billion in the next generation.52 This enormous demographic of
gamers generates $150 billion annually,53 which is forecast to double
48 See Raph Koster, Declaring the Rights of Players, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 10,
at 55, 56–61 (laying out “The Declaration of the Rights of Avatars” modeled after The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizens (Fr. 1789)).
49 See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 43 (2004) (arguing there is no obvious reason to prohibit recognition of legal interests in
intangible virtual properties); see also Caroline Bradley & A. Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds,
Real Rules: Using Virtual Worlds to Test Legal Rules, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 10, at
227, 232–33 (briefly describing different real and chattel property regimes in virtual worlds).
50 See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crime, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra
note 10, at 121, 122–27 (expounding on legal challenges to creating virtual crimes within game
world).
51

See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.

Koksal, supra note 15 (estimating 2.5 billion people around the world play video
games); see also Austen Goslin, Phil Spencer Says Amazon and Google are Xbox’s Real Competition, POLYGON (Feb. 5, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.polygon.com/2020/2/5/21124148/philspencer-microsoft-xbox-xcloud-amazon-google-competition [https://perma.cc/T729-LRPH]
(quoting Microsoft executive speculating that Google and Amazon are pushing to expand global
player base to seven billion people).
52

53 Tom Wijman, The Global Games Market Will Generate $152.1 Billion in 2019 as the U.S.
Overtakes China as the Biggest Market, NEWZOO (June 18, 2019), https://newzoo.com/insights/
articles/the-global-games-market-will-generate-152-1-billion-in-2019-as-the-u-s-overtakes-chinaas-the-biggest-market/ [https://perma.cc/GT63-VCL8] (estimating projected revenue of over
$150 billion in 2019).
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in the next five years.54 Loot boxes contribute a significant portion to
this revenue and projected growth,55 with one industry estimate reporting that these sales accounted for $30 billion in 2018.56 To put this
market power in perspective, the video game industry—and in some
cases, loot boxes alone—generate more annual revenue than the
Hollywood annual box office, the most popular domestic sports
leagues, and the mainstream music industry combined.57 Like all other
entertainment industries, virtual worlds have the potential for positive
social impact,58 but can also be a double-edged sword that can just as
easily cut the other way.59 When considering the sheer size of the industry, which way this sword cuts is an ongoing debate.
54 See id. (showing over 9% growth from 2018 to 2019 revenues, and further projected
growth through 2022); see also Koksal, supra note 15 (estimating that the video game industry
could be worth over $300 billion by 2025).
55 See AUSTL. SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 5 (citing research stating that 25% of
digital sales in the video game industry was generated by loot box sales); see also Loot Boxes &
In-Game Spend Drive Digital Games Market: Surpassing $160 Billion by 2022, JUNIPER RSCH.
(May 1, 2018), https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/loot-boxes-in-game-spenddrive-digital-games [https://perma.cc/H4AA-EKMH] (attributing projected growth of video
game industry to rely heavily on loot box sales over the next few years).
56 JUNIPER RSCH., IN-GAME GAMBLING—THE NEXT CASH COW FOR PUBLISHERS (2018),
https://www.juniperresearch.com/document-library/white-papers/in-game-gambling-the-nextcash-cow [https://perma.cc/J6U5-3ZG8].

See Samuel Stewart, Video Game Industry Silently Taking Over Entertainment World,
(Oct. 22, 2019, 8:33 AM), https://www.ejinsight.com/eji/article/id/2280405/20191022video-game-industry-silently-taking-over-entertainment-world [https://perma.cc/B98Q-WHJR];
see also Mark Hughes, 2018 Sets New Box Office Record With Enormous $41+ Billion Worldwide, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markhughes/2018/12/31/
2018-sets-new-box-office-record-with-enormous-41-billion-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/Q5MF8WPF]; Michael Colangelo, The NFL Made Roughly $16 Billion in Revenue Last Year, USA
TODAY: TOUCHDOWN WIRE (June 15, 2019, 10:32 PM), https://touchdownwire.usatoday.com/
2019/07/15/nfl-revenue-owners-players-billions/ [https://perma.cc/Q3EZ-XHMT]; Maury Brown,
MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2019, 7:02 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for-2019/
[https://perma.cc/44K2-YUYE]; Kurt Badenhausen, NBA Team Values 2019: Knicks on Top at
$4 Billion, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2019/
02/06/nba-team-values-2019-knicks-on-top-at-4-billion/ [https://perma.cc/944E-WXE7]; Hugh
McIntyre, The Global Music Industry Hit $19 Billion in Sales in 2018, Rising By Almost 10%,
FORBES (Apr. 2, 2019, 10:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2019/04/02/theglobal-music-industry-hits-19-billion-in-sales-in-2018-jumping-by-almost-10/ [https://perma.cc/
W28C-GFZC].
58 See, e.g., Jon Porter, Hearthstone Player Banned for Supporting Hong Kong Protesters
During Live Stream, VERGE (Oct. 8, 2019, 8:06 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/8/
20904308/hearthstone-player-blitzchung-hong-kong-protesters-ban-blizzard [https://perma.cc/
E28Y-VSM4] (reporting story of controversial political protest on gaming platform); see also
MCGONIGAL, supra note 9, at 236–42 (describing Folding@home project that combined network
of PlayStation 3 processors to solve complex genome scientific problems).
59 See, e.g., Mark D. Griffiths & Alex Meredith, Video Game Addiction and Its Treatment,
57

EJINSIGHT
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Virtual economics—like real-world economics—finds its foundation in the study of human behavior when balancing ends with scarce
means.60 Scarcity in the real world is a matter of naturally occurring
resources or manufactured goods and their efficient allocation. Virtual
economies, on the other hand, rely on the artificial scarcity of digital
resources such as virtual currencies and virtual goods.61 For example,
the value of real-world commodities like gold is a combination of the
metal’s natural scarcity and the costs of extracting it from the earth.
The value of virtual commodities like gold in World of Warcraft, however, is a function of the careful calibration that game developers62
make in the virtual world.63 It costs nearly nothing for them to extract
or refine other than typing in a few keystrokes of computer code.64
This is what makes virtual economies so entertaining; players
complete artificially designed obstacles to garner virtual rewards according to a work-to-reward ratio. But instead of spending precious
time earning these rewards, some players prefer to use microtransactions to buy these virtual goods.65
Microtransactions are in-game purchases in which players use
real-world money to buy virtual goods.66 Microtransactions give players more options. Instead of playing the game for hours doing a task
(such as hunting monsters or gathering minerals), players can bypass
the work-to-reward ratio by purchasing the valuable virtual goods if
the real-world price is right. Microtransactions have quickly become
39 J. CONTEMP. PSYCHOTHERAPY 247 (2009) (detailing psychological condition of addiction to
video games); John T. Holden, Thomas A. Baker III & Marc Edelman, The #E-Too Movement:
Fighting Back Against Sexual Harassment in Electronic Sports, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 14–21 (2020)
(outlining subculture of sexual harassment on online gaming and media platforms).
60 See VILI LEHDONVIRTA & EDWARD CASTRONOVA, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES 1, 42 (Sandra
Braman & Paul Jaeger eds., 2014) (quoting Lionel Robbins, former head of the economics department at the London School of Economics, and discussing that virtual worlds do not reinvent
economics but merely apply it to new situations).
61

See id. at 1.

For purposes of this Article, the term “developer” will be used to refer to the larger
value chain—which includes artists, programmers, designers, and publishers—that covers the
vast number of activities and corporate entities that create a video game and bring it to market.
62

63 See Daniel Friedman, World of Warcraft’s Inflation Problem Could Finally Be Hitting
Regular Players, POLYGON (Aug. 22, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.polygon.com/2018/8/22/
17759824/world-of-warcraft-azeroth-economy-gold [https://perma.cc/52JG-VWLX].
64 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 1–2 (explaining that while some
digital goods and information can be “duplicated indefinitely,” other digital resources are unique
and cannot be duplicated).
65

See RYAN ROGERS, HOW VIDEO GAMES IMPACT PLAYERS 138 (2016).

See id. (describing microtransactions as purchasing options allowing players to buy content beyond original price of game).
66
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the dominant revenue source in the video game industry,67 with more
games incorporating them to maximize profits.68
Loot boxes are a type of microtransaction that offer randomized
rewards in virtual containers.69 The Ultimate Team mode in the popular FIFA soccer video game franchise is one of the most well-documented examples. First, players can use real-world money to purchase
virtual coins,70 which can then be used to purchase virtual card packs
without knowing the contents.71 Virtual coins can also be earned by
playing the game, but the work-to-reward ratio is specifically designed
to be so burdensome that it encourages players to spend real-world
money as a needed shortcut.72 Second, players open these card packs
to great virtual fanfare;73 like the inviting sounds, colors, and music of
a slot machine, inventive visual and auditory tools are used to enhance
the pleasure of the experience.74 Third, the player can now form a
better soccer team to take the virtual field in competition based on the
virtual rewards received from the card pack.75 To maintain the value
of these virtual rewards, loot boxes use similar random reward mecha67 See Yasin Sebastian Qureshi, Virtual Goods Economy: How Blockchain Could Empower Gamers, IRISH TECH NEWS (Nov. 8, 2018), https://irishtechnews.ie/when-atari-releasedlegendary-pong-some-45-years-ago-its-major-commercial-success-triggered-the-beginning-ofmodern-video-game-industry-soon-gaming-would-transcend-the-domain-of-t/ [https://perma.cc/
Y89G-8XKS] (“From more than 2.3 billion active gamers in the world in 2018, 1.1 billion (46%)
spent money on games. The majority of them spent money on in-game items or virtual goods.”).
68 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 3 (noting that developers are
increasingly making more money from microtransactions).
69 See Drummond & Sauer, supra note 2, at 530.
70 This conversion of money into virtual currency is a monetary dissociation strategy that
casinos also use. See Khadijah McFadden, Note, The Tax Web of Unredeemed Gambling Chips,
97 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 95, 103 (2019). The gambling industry recognizes that casino chips
(like virtual coins) help obscure from consumers how much money they are spending based on
these degrees of transaction separation. See FTC Workshop, Inside the Game: Unlocking the
Consumer Issues Surrounding Loot Boxes 63, 67 (Aug. 7, 2019) [hereinafter FTC Workshop],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1511966/loot_boxes_workshop_tran
script.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV2C-WERP] (statement of John Breyault, Vice President, Public
Policy Telecommunications and Fraud at National Consumers League) (highlighting “cognitive
load” put on user, which often results in lack of ability to create “complex exchange rate between digital money and real dollars”).
71 See What Is FIFA Ultimate Team? FIFA Ultimate Team Explained, FIFA ADDICTION
[hereinafter FIFA Ultimate Team], http://fifaaddiction.com/ultimate-team/what-is-fifa-ultimateteam [https://perma.cc/K2YG-QS4M].
72 See id.
73 See Jason M. Bailey, A Video Game ‘Loot Box’ Offers Coveted Rewards, but Is It Gambling?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/business/loot-boxesvideo-games.html [https://perma.cc/XT5N-FTNG] (comparing the sounds given by casino slot
machines to the sounds given in games that feature loot boxes).
74 Id.
75 See FIFA Ultimate Team, supra note 71.
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nisms (“RRM”) as slot machines, using complex algorithms76 to allocate different tiers of prizes based on their value;77 virtual prizes of
higher value are much harder to come by, just like how higher slot
machine payouts are rare. Based on these RRMs, one estimate suggested that the most popular “gold” tier rewards in FIFA translate
into tens of thousands of dollars in real-world money based on their
rarity in the FIFA marketplace.78
This new normal of the expanding microtransaction business
model has prompted government agencies and scholars to study virtual economies to properly regulate them, including differentiating between closed, hybrid, and open virtual economies.79 A closed virtual
economy is completely self-contained. There is no comingling, sale, or
exchange of virtual currency with real-world currency.80 This might
look like a virtual world based on the popular board game of Monopoly; fake artificial currency can only be earned through playing the
game. Similarly, the artificial Monopoly currency cannot leave the virtual world to be exchanged or liquidated into real-world money or to
pay for real-world services.
A hybrid virtual economy describes somewhat of a greenhouse
for real-world money; it can enter the virtual world, but it cannot
exit.81 Players are free to spend real-world money to buy virtual goods
76 See Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 428–29 (2006)
(detailing that most slot machines are now operated by algorithms on a network with similar
devices to manage payouts across a casino’s network).
77 See Drummond & Sauer, supra note 2, at 530 (explaining RRM mechanics and variable
reinforcement in loot boxes); FIFA Ultimate Team, supra note 71 (explaining different tiers of
prizes in FIFA card pack system).
78 See Ronan Murphy, FIFA Ultimate Team: How Much Does It Cost to Get All the Best
Players, GOAL (Mar. 22, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.goal.com/en-us/news/fifa-ultimate-teamhow-much-cost-get-all-best-players/9kyct7nxj1tj1rixzb6omeeqh [https://perma.cc/3ZAH-8AA7]
(finding that it would take approximately $50,000 to obtain the best gold rewards in FIFA 21);
see also Aykut Oezbey, FIFA 21—Is This the Most Expensive FUT Team Ever?, ESPORTS.COM
(Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.esports.com/en/fifa-21-is-this-the-most-expensive-fut-team-ever192492 [https://perma.cc/3ZEM-PLNX]; Wesley Yin-Poole, FIFA Player Uses GDPR to Find
Out Everything EA Has on Him, Realises He’s Spent Over $10,000 in Two Years on Ultimate
Team, EUROGAMER (July 25, 2018), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2018-07-23-fifa-playeruses-gdpr-to-find-out-everything-ea-has-on-him-realises-hes-spent-over-usd10-000-in-two-yearson-ultimate-team [https://perma.cc/3FXD-VK8T].
79 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 4–6 (2013)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
80 Id.
81 Bitcoin is a popular exception to this rule that could be considered as a virtual currency
mined in a virtual world that can be liquidated or used to buy real-world goods and services. See
Scott A. Wiseman, Note, Property or Currency? The Tax Dilemma Behind Bitcoin, 2016 UTAH
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through microtransactions and loot boxes, but those virtual goods are
not allowed to be exchanged back into real-world money.82 Instead,
those virtual resources can be used to buy, sell, or barter within the
virtual world for other virtual resources—like selling a Sword of
Destiny83 for 100 virtual gold, or buying the same sword for that price.
Hybrid virtual economies dominate the gaming industry84 and have
started to garner attention from some regulators because they do intermingle real-world money with virtual goods.85 But even hybrid
economies have allowed virtual currency to escape, which has led to
the rise of using virtual currencies to pay for real-world goods and
services.86 Bitcoin might be considered a popular example of this phenomena, where a limited virtual resource is mined by computers,
which can then be used as a virtual currency to buy real-world goods
and services.87
An open virtual economy has a free flow of buying, selling, and
exchanging virtual currency and goods for real-world currency and
goods. Not only can players use real-world money to purchase virtual
goods through microtransactions and loot boxes, but they can also
freely sell their virtual goods on primary or secondary marketplaces
for real-world money.88 With the rotating door left open and the magic
circle nearly extinguished, it is no surprise that open virtual economies
invite the most real-world scrutiny.89 Because virtual goods can readily
be valuated by normal market forces, people have even sued developL. REV. 417, 418 (describing rise in popularity of virtual currencies like Bitcoin and real-world
implications).
82

GAO REPORT, supra note 79, at 4.

While the Sword of Destiny is a mere hypothetical example of a virtual item in a transaction, it is also the title of a popular book in the gaming and fantasy communities. See generally
ANDRZEJ SAPKOWSKI, SWORD OF DESTINY (David French trans., Orbit Books 2015) (1993) (exemplifying fantasy world of The Witcher franchise, which spans books, video games, and
television).
83

84 See generally LASTOWKA, supra note 11 (discussing some of the largest video games in
the industry, most of which feature hybrid virtual economies).
85

See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 79, at 1.

See, e.g., Mark Wallace, The Game Is Virtual. The Profit Is Real, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/business/yourmoney/the-game-is-virtual-the-profitis-real.html [https://perma.cc/Q6A9-S65G].
86

87 See Wiseman, supra note 81, at 421 (describing rise in popularity of virtual currencies
like Bitcoin and real-world implications).
88

GAO REPORT, supra note 79, at 5.

See, e.g., LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 164 (detailing FBI investigation into gambling with virtual currency in open virtual economies like Second Life); LASTOWKA,
supra note 11, at 104 (describing 2008 congressional hearing on impact of virtual worlds, which
almost exclusively focused on open economy implications of Second Life).
89
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ers when they have made changes to the virtual world that compromised the value of their virtual property.90
The closed-hybrid-open virtual economic spectrum also impacts
transactions for virtual goods. Developers sell microtransactions and
loot boxes in primary marketplaces.91 In order to maximize profits,
developers often claim exclusive rights to create and sell these virtual
goods to players92 through End User Licensing Agreements
(“EULA”).93 EULAs are the click-wrap version of traditional shrinkwrap contracts.94 By clicking “accept,” players forfeit many traditional
rights they might enjoy in the real world, such as the right to own
virtual currency, goods, or property.95 Legally, players do not own anything in the virtual world, but are only granted a license to use these
virtual assets at the pleasure of the developers.96 And in order to protect this monopoly of microtransactions,97 most developers include
provisions in their EULAs that ban players from buying or selling virtual goods in secondary marketplaces.98
The high demand for virtual goods has fostered a rich secondary
marketplace, regardless of the risks that come with violating EULAs.99 These secondary markets are best analogized to popular websites like eBay.com, where players can list virtual goods on a database
and entertain offers from other players.100 Millions of virtual goods are
on sale through such secondary markets every day101 and were esti90 See Bragg v. Linden Rsch., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595–97 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (player of
open virtual economy game Second Life sued developer when it recalled virtual property that
player had already purchased); Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom
to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2071 (2004) (“If virtual items have real-world
equivalent values . . . the game designer may be destroying a considerable amount of value by
turning off the game, and the more value that is destroyed, the less likely the law will stand for
it.”).
91 See Eino Joas, Are Secondary Markets Beneficial for a Virtual World Operator? 8
(2016) (M.S. thesis, Aalto University School of Business), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/84c4/
8905c1692b52b970881466e5dfa3139fed0f.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WW3-A3WT].
92 See id. at 31 (detailing monopoly of primary virtual markets); see also LEHDONVIRTA &
CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 118.
93 See Castronova, supra note 46, at 76 (describing contours of EULAs).
94 See LASTOWKA, supra note 11, at 92 (describing industry practice of click-wrap
contracts).
95 Id.
96 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1082 (2005).
97 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 118.
98 See Castronova, supra note 46, at 74 (acknowledging that many publishers tacitly accept
secondary market trade as unavoidable given size and scope of virtual goods market).
99 See Joas, supra note 91, at 38.
100 See id. at 8.
101 Balkin & Noveck, supra note 10, at 4.
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mated to be worth over $50 billion in market value worldwide in
2017.102 But these primary and illegitimate secondary markets still
leave the deeper question unanswered of who really owns these virtual items from a legal and practical perspective, which is central to
determining who benefits from the value of virtual goods.
B. Virtual Property: Virtual Value to Players
These issues exploring virtual ownership, licenses, and profits
when transacting for virtual goods are important aspects scholars have
discussed that inform how virtual goods should be valuated, and to
whom such value should be assigned. Raph Koster has gone as far as
to draft a “Declaration of the Rights of Avatars” that includes the
inalienable right to own property in the virtual world.103 Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter have argued that there is no obvious reason to
prohibit a player’s legal interests in intangible virtual property.104
Joshua Fairfield has gone one step further to argue for a robust intellectual property regime that would not threaten the ownership rights
of developers, but would merely expand protections to players who
spent time or money obtaining the virtual good.105
Intellectual property law has a long history of assigning realworld value to nontangible property. The sale of software licenses,
streaming music, and other tools to separate ownership from use is
one of the bedrocks of intellectual property.106 But the primary versus
secondary marketplace battle prevents intellectual property from determining the value of virtual goods. While players in secondary markets can sell any virtual good to other players, this violates the EULA
102 See WAX io, How on Earth Is Trading Virtual Items in Video Games a $50 Billion
Industry?, MEDIUM (Dec. 11, 2017), https://medium.com/wax-io/how-on-earth-is-trading-virtualitems-in-video-games-a-50-billion-industry-5972c211d621 [https://perma.cc/SU3W-96R3] (claiming virtual market for virtual goods was worth $50 billion in 2017).
103 See Koster, supra note 48, at 56; see also Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright
and Contract Law at the Dawn of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 290–94, 304 (2007) (discussing
arguments supporting virtual property rights).
104 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 49, at 40–49.
105 See Fairfield, supra note 96, at 1096 (“[O]wnership of virtual property does not threaten
the intellectual property interest held by the creator of the property. It protects the interests of
the purchaser of the object. An owner of virtual property owns the same rights that the owner of
a book does.”).
106 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 998 (1997) (describing transactions between owners of creative works and
those that want to license the work for other use through intellectual property rights of the
owner); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1214, 1225–38 (2015) (outlining separation of ownership and use of
virtual or online property through software licensing agreements).
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obligations of both the secondary buyer and seller.107 Secondary markets can be fruitful to determine the accurate real-world value of virtual goods, but such valuation comes at the cost of breaching private
agreements with developers. And it is unlikely that any legitimate valuation of virtual goods could stand on the shoulders of its corresponding illegitimate market value. One solution might be for courts to
declare these EULA provisions unconscionable or void, but that
would have even larger implications by erasing the freedom to contract.108 It would also mandate that all virtual worlds become open
economies because all primary and secondary sales of virtual goods
would be admissible. As noted above, this would open all virtual
worlds to a level of scrutiny that many developers seek to avoid.109
The property interests, ownership, and licensing of virtual goods is still
very much on the cutting edge of digital property law, and continues
to be litigated as more consumers and virtual property advocates seek
to assert ownership over the virtual assets they purchase or earn.110
These questions of property—which often seek to determine the
potential benefits of ownership—must also be considered against the
potential liabilities. Tax scholars have led on this issue, proposing various theories on the tax liabilities that might come with virtual ownership.111 This is yet another key question tied to virtual value: if people
own and are benefiting from assets in the virtual world, how should
these assets be taxed according to income revenue or investment
growth? Leandra Lederman and Bryan Camp were among the first to
outline tax frameworks for virtual goods,112 agreeing that microtranSee LASTOWKA, supra note 11, at 93–94.
See Fairfield, supra note 96, at 1083–84 (arguing EULAs may not be enforceable under
contract and property theory based on creation of user value in enhancing the game and
property).
109 See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also LASTOWKA, supra note 11, at 142
(stating that developers have little incentive in giving players property rights in virtual goods).
110 See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Amazon.com, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, 9–11, Caudel v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00848,
2021 WL 4819602 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2021) (arguing that consumers who buy Prime Video content do not own the content, but rather own a perpetual license to stream the content); Julian
Dibbell, Owned! Intellectual Property in the Age of eBayers, Gold Farmers, and Other Enemies
of the Virtual State, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 10, at 137, 142 (describing virtual economic justice in the ownership of virtual goods, and what it says about power in a semifictional
world).
111 See, e.g., Jeffrey Anand, Note, Virtual Economies Virtually Unregulated: How Clear
Taxpayer Guidance Can Mitigate Tax Compliance Risks, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253 (2014).
112 See Leandra Lederman, “Stranger Than Fiction”: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1620, 1620, 1665–70 (2007) (describing open virtual economy of Second Life that gives
users rights to buy, sell, and trade virtual goods); Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory
of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2–5 (2007).
107
108
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sactions in closed or hybrid virtual economies should not be taxed because these virtual acquisitions cannot generate or be exchanged for
real-world currency.113 Other scholars diverge on the optimal taxation
model for open virtual economies,114 but there is still a general consensus that the “cash-out” rule should serve as a baseline for taxing
income when virtual currency or goods are exchanged for real-world
money.115 This has become an issue of such economic import that even
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) was forced to confront the issue, giving limited guidance on the taxation of virtual currencies, like
Bitcoin,116 while declining to tax virtual currencies, like Fortnite’s popular V-Bucks, because they cannot be exchanged for real-world
money.117
While the tax treatment of virtual currency has received some attention,118 there is still little guidance on the tax treatment of virtual
goods. Like other forms of chattel property, virtual goods should not
be taxed as a type of income or investment medium until a recognition
event, which is usually at the point of resale.119 After all, not every113 See Camp, supra note 112, at 2 (“This Article’s central thesis is that . . . player activity
that occurs solely within the online virtual world is not gross income under current doctrine, nor
should current doctrine change.”); Lederman, supra note 112, at 1670 (“There is a strong
case . . . for not taxing in-game receipts and trades within game worlds, including sales within
those games for virtual currency.”).
114 Compare Lederman, supra note 112, at 1665–66 (arguing that any sale for a virtual item
that involves a virtual currency that is readily exchangeable for real-world dollars should be
taxed because the virtual currency is merely a stand-in for real-world currency), with Camp,
supra note 112, at 70 (arguing that only sales for a virtual item that directly involve real-world
money should be taxed).
115 See, e.g., Camp, supra note 112, at 45; Lederman, supra note 112, at 1625 (discussing a
“cash-out rule”); Theodore P. Seto, When Is a Game Only a Game?: The Taxation of Virtual
Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027, 1029–30 (2009) (arguing that taxation should depend upon
whether virtual goods are either convertible or redeemable).
116 See Wiseman, supra note 81, at 430 (indicating that the IRS taxes virtual currencies like
Bitcoin similarly to transactions of real property or stocks, as opposed to taxing it as income).
117 See IRS Statement on Changes to Virtual Currency Webpage, IRS (Feb. 14, 2020), https://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-statement-on-changes-to-virtual-currency-webpage [https://perma.cc/
M8VC-8DPC] (clarifying an earlier statement to mean that “[t]ransacting in virtual currencies as
part of a game that do not leave the game environment (virtual currencies that are not convertible) would not require a taxpayer to indicate this on their tax return”); Kelly Phillips Erb, After
Confusion, IRS Clarifies Tax Treatment of Fortnite & Gaming Currencies, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2020,
2:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2020/02/15/after-confusion-irs-clarifiestax-treatment-of-fortnite—gaming-currencies/ [https://perma.cc/KHF5-PURC].
118 Even foreign governments, like China and South Korea have moved to regulate these
virtual economies through various taxation models. See Special Report: Video Games, ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2011), https://soundcloud.com/theeconomist/special-report-video-games [https://
perma.cc/S65X-XECN] (describing China’s and South Korea’s efforts to tax and even prohibit
virtual currency transactions).
119 See 1 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., IRS, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2008 ANNUAL
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thing that has a discernable real-world value is taxed, often because
the government would have difficulty enforcing the law or because
taxpayers would have difficulty complying with it.120 Frequent flyer
miles are not taxed even though they can be readily transferred into
discounted or free airline tickets and have a readily discernable fairmarket value.121 For the same reason, a boy in the stands on a hot
summer’s day that catches a home run baseball is not taxed, even
though that baseball might have a discernable fair-market value in a
secondary market.122 Not until the boy sells the baseball and generates
an income is it touched by the IRS.123
Scholars have led the way for over a decade in finding creative
solutions to argue for player rights while balancing social costs in virtual economies. But these efforts have largely been tethered to the
real-world value that virtual goods garner.124 This makes sense from
the unique perspectives of those areas of law. Schools of intellectual
property argue that such a property regime is motivated to incentivize
creation by maximizing real-world monetary gain for creators.125 Tax
law is also traditionally thought to incentivize behavior that maximizes
real-world social welfare through the division and maintenance of asREPORT TO CONGRESS 220 (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_intro_toc_msp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/54ER-DM48] (citing Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931)).
120

See id.

See IRS Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621 (declaring that “[t]he IRS will not
assert that any taxpayer has understated his federal tax liability by reason of the receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind promotional benefits attributable to the taxpayer’s business or official travel”). But see Dominic L. Daher, The Proposed Federal Taxation
of Frequent Flyer Miles Received from Employers: Good Tax Policy but Bad Politics, 16 AKRON
TAX J. 1, 2 (2001) (suggesting that the receipt of frequent flyer miles is taxable under current law
and that the IRS’s announcement was the result of political pressure).
121

122 Compare IRS News Release IR-98-56 (Sept. 8, 1998), with Darren Heil, The Tax Implications of Catching Mark McGwire’s 62nd Home Run Ball, 52 TAX LAW. 871 (1999) (arguing
that a taxpayer should be taxed even if he or she returns the ball because he or she exercises
dominion and control over it).
123 Note that the IRS has not provided explicit clarification on whether such income would
be taxed and has not yet made any efforts to tax such catches until they are sold in regular
commerce. See Andrew D. Appleby, Ball Busters: How the IRS Should Tax Record-Setting Baseballs and Other Found Property Under the Treasure Trove Regulation, 33 VT. L. REV. 43, 45–48
(2008).
124 See Nika Antonikova, Real Taxes on Virtual Currencies: What Does the I.R.S. Say, 34
VA. TAX REV. 433, 435–36 (2015).
125 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1745, 1749–53 (2012) (explaining utilitarian incentives of giving ownership rights and financial incentives to content creators); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 628–40 (2012) (acknowledging and critiquing incentive theories
of intellectual property).
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sets.126 Reducing these areas of law into simplistic summaries leaves
out important nuances, but nevertheless illustrates why these fields
view virtual goods through the lens of the power and value they confer in the real world. Consequently, the existing literature holds little
explanatory power over the importance of virtual goods and the full
range of their value in the virtual world.
C. Virtual Reality: Perceived Value to Consumers
What the legal literature on virtual value misses, the social science literature can fill. This is especially important to identify the market drivers that coax players to spend money chasing after loot box
rewards. A more fulsome view of virtual worlds must account for the
perceived value consumers assign to virtual goods based on their social,127 expressive,128 and utility129 value that are exclusive to the player
experience in the virtual world.130
Economic theories of consumption have long recognized the diverse values of a product that affect a consumer’s purchasing decisions.131 This comports with rational choice economics, positing that
rational consumers will make behavioral choices in line with their
preferences.132 From a consumer’s standpoint, this economic choice
can often be reduced to a trade-off between costs and benefits and an
assessment of getting a return that is more than their original investment.133 But such an investment of consumer time—known as the
126 See generally JOHN F. O’CONNELL, WELFARE ECONOMIC THEORY (1982) (postulating
that tax theory is based on optimal outcomes of social welfare and benefits to society, as well as
social choice that incentivizes people to make efficient economic decisions).
127 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 265 (measuring “gross virtual
product” of virtual economies by, in part, assessing social benefits of virtual goods).
128 See Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 10, at 31,
40 (explaining that many people play in virtual worlds as a way to explore their identity).
129 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 52–53 (recognizing functional
value of virtual goods, as well as social and emotional value).
130 See id. at 265 (coining the term “gross virtual product” as a measurement of value for
virtual goods that assess their ability to “fulfill personal whims, establish identity positions, and
communicate values”).
131 See Jagdish N. Sheth, Bruce I. Newman & Barbara L. Gross, Why We Buy What We
Buy: A Theory of Consumption Values, 22 J. BUS. RSCH. 159, 160–63 (1991) (identifying five
different category values for consumption: functional, social, emotional, conditional, and
epistemic).
132 See Morris B. Holbrook, Introduction to Consumer Value, in CONSUMER VALUE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH 1, 5 (Morris B. Holbrook ed., 1999) (defining value
as “an interactive relativistic preference experience”).
133 See Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A MeansEnd Model and Synthesis of Evidence, 52 J. MKTG. 2, 22 (1988) (noting that one aspect of value
is a consumer’s assessment of what they get for what they give up).
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work-to-reward ratio—or money is rarely tied to pecuniary gain. Instead, the perceived value of any good or service is judged by a number of factors independent of monetary reward, including the social,
expressive, or utility rewards of purchasing the good or service.134 In
other words, consumers buy real-world goods and services based on
how fresh flowers make them feel, the social status that comes with
flashing a Rolex, or the practical uses of buying a ladder to clean a
roof gutter. This same concept of perceived value is just as true in the
virtual world as it is in the real world.135
Social value takes many forms in the virtual world with similar
parallels in the real world. Purchasing a virtual good can enhance
one’s membership status in a group of friends136 in the same way that
buying matching uniforms in a real-world summer athletic league
might. But apart from enhancing the social experience with friends
and others, social value also serves an important signaling function.137
Whether a player invests time or money attaining the Sword of
Destiny, merely having this valuable virtual good communicates
something to other players. It can signal the skill level of a person who
has overcome levels of gameplay to acquire such a rare virtual good,
and it can also signal the real-world wealth or luck of a player who
decided to pay for such an expensive virtual good through microtransactions or loot boxes.138 People buy expensive cars and jewelry for
the same reasons.
People buy goods for many other reasons as well, such as their
unique ability to serve as mediums of expression or reimagination of
personal identity.139 This expressive value also factors into the virtual
world.
Virtual avatars can take on different genders, hair colors, tattoos,
races, clothing styles, and a number of other attributes that are different from their real-world player.140 Players can enjoy the freedom to
be different people, live in different places, and perform different jobs
than they do in the real world as a form of escapism and even experi134 See J. Brock Smith & Mark Colgate, Customer Value Creation: A Practical Framework,
15 J. MKTG. THEORY & PRAC. 7, 23 (2007) (providing taxonomy of perceived value, including
“symbolic/expressive,” “experiential/hedonic,” “functional/instrumental,” and “cost/sacrifice”).
135 See Bartle, supra note 128, at 46 (outlining social importance of virtual goods).
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 40.
140 See LASTOWKA, supra note 11, at 48 (describing people exploring different sexualities
and identities in virtual worlds by creating avatars that differ from their own sexual identity).
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mentation.141 This expressive value has signaling effects as well, both
to express membership in a group or to express the “cool” factor of
standing out in a crowd.142 But expressive value is distinctly personal,
often classified as more hedonistic by bringing personal pleasure to
the player.143 In this way, virtual goods are valued according to how
they make a player feel, the aesthetic pleasure derived, and the sentimental bonds formed with the virtual good.144
Many goods, such as an expensive car, have more uses than being
tools of social and expressive value; for instance, they can actually be
driven. This utility value is also incredibly important to people in the
real and virtual world when making purchasing decisions.145 While an
expensive car does still have utility in getting a person or avatar from
point A to point B, the utility value is often secondary to the social
and expressive value. Jewelry is the quintessential example of an item
of high social and expressive value with little utility value. It does not
actually do anything other than enhance aesthetics and status. But
there are many items that help a hero along their journey in the virtual world; one of the driving factors of progress is empowering your
avatar by investing in its ability to overcome the next obstacle.146
Thus, certain virtual goods may be valued based on their unique attributes to help players reach the next level of progress.
Players and consumers assess these perceived values differently
according to their preferences. Some choose to invest their time and
money into virtual goods that give them more utility to enhance how
they play the game.147 Some will choose differently to form social
bonds or to stand out in the virtual crowd.148 This same concept is true
in the real world, like when consumers choose to spend $4.00 on a Pet
141

See id. at 47–48.

See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 42 (explaining the value of standing out in a crowd in the virtual world). Land use and real property scholars have also recognized the importance of property, development, and neighborhood aesthetics as a way of
expressing group and individual identity. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 994, 1015 (1982) (recognizing property as an expression of individual and group identity).
142

143 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 51 (explaining that the hedonic
aspect of personal consumption is not based on social relationships, but personal preferences).
144

See id.

145

See id. at 52–53 (explaining actual utility for in-game activities).

See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 50, at 124 (“Most players . . . do have clear goals in
virtual worlds, and the predominant goal is to seek the virtual empowerment of their avatars.”).
146

147

See AUSTL. SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 29.

148

See id.

2022]

PANDORA’S LOOT BOX

401

Rock.149 While it seems like a waste of money to the masses, buying a
rock is perfectly in line with that consumer’s preferences to spend
their money on something that will give them some sort of subjective
perceived value. And if a consumer wants to buy a Sword of Destiny
for $400.00, is this any less rationale according to that player’s preferences? The answer must be no.150
The perceived value of virtual goods is so important to players
that in some virtual worlds, it has turned many virtual goods into a
commodity currency.151 For example, players have been known to
trade virtual chairs as currency due to their utility value,152 or even to
wager virtual “skins” on the outcome of a competitive match due to
their expressive value.153
The social, expressive, and utility aspects of perceived values are
well-accepted concepts that are already appreciated in many realworld transactions154 and must be a part of studying virtual worlds. So
as virtual economists have asked and answered, “[w]hy do people desire virtual goods? . . . For all the same reasons as they desire physical
goods!”155
II.

EXPLORING REAL-WORLD VALUE IN
GAMBLING REGULATION

THE

WORLD

OF

Money is the fuel of gambling; it drives it, as petrol powers a
car, but the pleasure of driving a car is not about petroleum.
It’s about speed, style, movement. Fuel is merely what makes
149 See CHOU, supra note 8, at 168–69 (explaining sales of Pet Rock product in 1970s and
why it found a niche market).
150 See AUSTL. SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 28–29 (citing Australian gambling experts stating that value in a virtual world is enough to motivate virtual purchasing decisions).
151 See John T. Holden & Sam C. Ehrlich, Esports, Skins Betting, and Wire Fraud Vulnerability, 8 GAMING L. REV. 566, 570–73 (2017).
152 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 177–78 (describing a virtual community in Habbo Hotel exchanging chairs as a type of currency in virtual bartering transactions).
153 The term “skins” refers to the aesthetic appearance of a character’s avatar or their virtual accessories. See CHRIS GROVE, UNDERSTANDING SKIN GAMBLING 2 (2016) (providing an
overview of what skins are and their purpose in the video game industry and referring to them as
a “de facto currency”); see also Taylor Stanton Hardenstein, Comment, “Skins” in the Game:
Counter-Strike, Esports, and the Shady World of Online Gambling, 7 U. Nev. L.V. GAMING L.J.
117, 124 (2017) (arguing that CS:GO skin betting should be regulated as gambling because skins
are used as consideration in gambling transactions).
154 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 50, at 126 (“Virtual chattels . . . are currently being
created, traded, and socially valued in ways that are generally compatible with traditional theories of property.”).
155

LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 53.
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the car run. In that sense, the real motives behind gambling
are to be sought elsewhere.
—David Spanier156
Unlike the study of virtual worlds, gambling and its regulation
have been recognized and debated for generations. Gambling covers a
wide variety of activities, including betting on horse races, slot machines, card games, and a host of other ways to wager money on uncertain outcomes and events.157 But because of the old interpretations
of antiquated state laws, gambling for virtual goods in loot box transactions has eluded regulation.
This Part continues by providing a brief landscape of state and
federal gambling laws and then dives deeper into specific case law that
informs the interpretation of the prize/value element of gambling activity that is central to the loot box problem. It proceeds by explaining
specific regulatory interventions taken by public and private actors to
mitigate the harms of activities once relevant authorities have deemed
the activities gambling.
A. The Elements of Gambling: The Value of Prizes
Like the video game industry, the expansion of the internet and
mobile phones has taken the gambling industry to another level because of the ease of access these platforms provide.158 In 2017, worldwide gambling revenues were estimated to be approximately $450
billion; but the flip side of that coin is understanding that gambling
losses of individual consumers generate the majority of these impressive revenues.159 As more gambling activity spawns onto new, colorful,160 and creative platforms and devices, it seems that video games
DAVID SPANIER, THE HAND I PLAYED: A POKER MEMOIR 50 (2001).
See BARRIE GUNTER, GAMBLING ADVERTISING: NATURE, EFFECTS AND REGULATION
1 (2019); see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and
the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 241–42 (2001) (differentiating between various gambling activities of pure chance and those mixed with skill).
158 See Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1570 (1999) (explaining that “[t]he sudden and ready accessibility
of Internet gambling has the potential to turn every home and office into a gambling parlor”);
Mirella Yani-de-Soriano, Uzma Javed & Shumaila Yousafzai, Can an Industry Be Socially Responsible If Its Products Harm Consumers? The Case of Online Gambling, 110 J. BUS. ETHICS
481, 483 (2012) (“During the last decade, home-based gambling (via the Internet, telephone,
interactive television or mobile phone) has become increasingly popular, fueled by new technologies, e.g. tablets, laptops, netbooks and smartphones.”).
159 GUNTER, supra note 157, at 1 (reporting estimated gambling revenues and losses worldwide in 2017).
160 See id. at 22, 50 (explaining that gambling industry experiments with situational and
156
157
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and gambling have many synergies.161 It is this landscape of losses that
contextualizes the need for a commensurate framework of consumer
protection regulations on gambling activities.
Like many criminal and civil regulations, gambling regulation is
primarily governed by state laws, which in most cases were enacted
generations ago during the various times when gambling was going in
and out of prohibition.162 Gambling has grown tremendously in the
digital age, relying more on these websites, social media gambling
apps, and fantasy leagues.163 Having transcended the physical brick
and mortar casinos or riverboats subject to states’ physical jurisdiction, the federal government has since federalized gambling crimes in
an effort to regulate interstate online gambling.164 As an example, the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”),165 enacted in 2006, prohibits websites from accepting electronic payments
for placing bets or wagers.166 But the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n167—declaring the federal government’s ban on sports betting unconstitutional because it
unlawfully prohibited states’ own powers to regulate gambling168—
shows that the era of federalizing gambling law may be coming to an
end, and the power to regulate gambling is transitioning back into the
hands of the states.
Although many commentators and experts have proposed that
federal law might be able to curb emerging online and sports gambling
activities,169 many federal gambling laws are still reliant on state law.
structural factors have enhanced gambling experience by enhancing colors, lighting, music, and
sound effects).
161 See, e.g., id. at 3 (recognizing that combining gambling with other forms of entertainment, like sports or other competition, enhances the fun of gambling).
162 See I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 75–90 (1986) (giving historical overview
of gambling regulation); Gabaldon, supra note 157, at 250 (same).
163 Keller, supra note 158, at 1570; Yani-de-Soriano et al., supra note 158, at 483 (explaining
growth of gambling industry due to internet and mobile devices, which also offers easy payment
systems, higher degree of privacy and secrecy, and 24/7 availability, among other factors).
164 Historically, the federal government’s regulation of gambling was also motivated to
curb the growth of organized crime, which drew large revenues from promoting and facilitating
gambling activities. See Nathaniel J. Ehrman, Note, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of PayTo-Play Daily Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS LAWS. J. 79, 95, 111 (2015).
165 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367.
166 Id.
167 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
168 See Mark Brnovich, Betting on Federalism: Murphy v. NCAA and the Future of Sports
Gambling, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 247, 259 (noting Murphy’s significance for state gambling
regulation and broader federalism principles).
169 See, e.g., Erik Gerstner, Note, Losing the Digital Shirt Off Your Back: Applying the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act to Virtual Property Betting, 9 WM. & MARY BUS.
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Some of these federal laws do not actually define gambling, but instead rely on state law to define gambling activities.170 The purpose of
these federal laws, then, is to proscribe or diminish activities that promote the interstate business of these gambling activities.171 As more
states take an active role in determining whether emerging technologies like fantasy leagues and eSports constitute gambling,172 state law
will continue to be the new frontier that shapes the future of online
gambling activity.173
These state laws come with minor variations, but most require
three elements gleaned from common law when defining gambling:
there must be (1) consideration in the form of something of value;
(2) to play a game of chance; (3) for the possibility of winning a
prize.174 The consideration element is generally fulfilled when somebody spends money175 or exhibits some type of effort to enter a gamL. REV. 321, 331–35 (2017) (arguing that the UIGEA could be interpreted to curb internet gambling in video games); Matthew R. Yost, Note, Video Game Gambling: Too Big a Bet for New
Jersey, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 335, 347, 360–61 (2017) (exploring federal law as a means to
regulate modern electronic sports betting); Holden & Ehrlich, supra note 151, at 566–67 (arguing
federal wire fraud statutes could be used to curb billion-dollar illegal skin gambling market).
170 See generally Sheldon A. Evans, Categorical Nonuniformity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1171,
1174–77 (2020) (arguing that federal reliance on state law definitions across civil and criminal
law causes inefficient variations and disparate treatment for similar conduct across state lines).
171 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (prohibiting interstate travel with intent to support unlawful
activity, such as illegal gambling defined under state law); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (prohibiting interstate distribution of gambling paraphernalia not applicable to digital age); 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(prohibiting gambling businesses as defined under state law); 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (defining
term “unlawful Internet gambling” as placing a bet or wager that violates federal or state law).
172 See, e.g., White v. Cuomo, 118 N.Y.S.3d 775, 779–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (holding
legislation permitting online fantasy sports betting violated New York constitution); Dew-Becker
v. Wu, No. 124472, slip op. at 4–6 (Ill. Apr. 16, 2020) (holding that online fantasy sports betting
was not gambling under Illinois state law); What are the States Where You Can Play Daily Fantasy Sports?, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/daily-fantasy-sportsblocked-allowed-states/ [https://perma.cc/5FHE-BNSK] (tracking state regulations of fantasy
sports).
173 Nothing is prohibiting Congress from enacting updated legislation, but, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy and the lack of political will to pass legislation, movement
from Congress is unlikely. For the many unsuccessful state and federal legislative attempts to
regulate loot boxes, see S. 1629, 116th Cong. (2019); see also, e.g., AUSTL. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 38 (listing the several proposed state legislative bills that were not passed into law);
Marc Edelman, Regulating Fantasy Sports: A Practical Guide to State Gambling Laws, and a
Proposed Framework for Future State Legislation, 92 IND. L.J. 653, 662–82 (2017) (describing
recent developments in state regulation of online gambling, specifically in the context of fantasy
sports).
174 See Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144,
200 (2014) (listing common elements of state gambling laws); see also Midwestern Enters., Inc. v.
Stenehjem, 625 N.W.2d 234, 237 (N.D. 2001).
175 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 2 (2021) (citing Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento, 737
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bling transaction such as buying a ticket, taking part in a free
promotion, or buying a product that automatically enters them in a
sweepstakes to earn an additional prize.176 The chance element is generally measured on a spectrum that examines a player’s ability—or
lack thereof—to control or influence an outcome in the game being
played.177 For example, slot machines and lotteries are perfect examples of games of chance because the player has no ability to influence
the outcome.178 Poker, by contrast, is often understood to be a mixed
game of chance and skill179 based on a player’s luck to draw certain
cards and their ability to influence other players through strategy.
The “prize” element, however, is central to properly assessing
games of chance—like loot boxes—that award virtual prizes. State
courts have consistently held that a “prize” needs to be “a thing of
value,”180 and different interpretations have produced several relevant
cases that inform how states value gambling prizes. On the one hand,
there is a consensus that these prizes of value do not have to be monetary winnings but can include a host of different prizes such as land,
S.E.2d 830 (S.C. 2012)); FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 295 n.15 (1954)
(“ ‘[C]onsideration’ involves, for example, the payment of money for the purchase of merchandise, chance or admission ticket, or as payment on an account, or requires an expenditure of
substantial effort or time.”).
176 See, e.g., Maughs v. Porter, 161 S.E. 242, 242–44 (Va. 1931) (holding that “raffle”
scheme giving free chances to persons who go to a store to register in order to participate in the
drawing of a prize was enough to fulfill consideration element); Grimes v. State, 178 So. 73, 74
(Ala. 1937) (holding that a “bank night” scheme of giving movie customers entry into sweepstakes was consideration because it increased plans to fill movie theater).
177 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 2 (2021) (defining “chance” as “a lack of control over
events or the absence of controllable causation,” that is, “the opposite of intention.” (citing Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599, 609 (Ala. 2006))).
178 See Peter H. Aranson & Roger LeRoy Miller, Economic Aspects of Public Gaming, 12
CONN. L. REV. 822, 829–30 (1980) (distinguishing pure games of chance, such as roulette, in
which outcomes are determined by “some kind of randomizing device,” and games of strategy,
such as chess, which depend on the ability of the player to make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty, and games that mix the two, such as poker, where strategy plays a large role, but the
element of chance, determining which cards a player receives, is also important).
179 See Anthony Cabot & Robert Hannum, Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics, and
the Future of an American Tradition, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 443, 459 (2005) (describing nationwide splits among states on whether poker is a gambling activity based on chance element);
see, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Thomas J. Miles & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Is Texas Hold ‘Em a Game
of Chance? A Legal and Economic Analysis, 101 GEO. L.J. 581, 584–85 (2013) (using statistical
analysis to conclude Texas Hold ‘Em is predominantly a game of skill).
180 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 330b(a) (West 2021) (stating that winning a “thing of
value” is sufficient to fulfill the traditional prize element of gambling); State v. Apodoca, 251 P.
389, 389 (N.M. 1926) (finding that slot machine that awarded nominal prizes constituted gambling); Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 739–41 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(determining that virtual chips won in casino game simulator were not things of value).
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vacations, cars, or other valuable goods.181 On the other hand, courts
have yet to directly answer whether this understanding of value extends to virtual goods. The following cases give valuable insight into
how courts think about valuing non-monetary rewards in gamblinglike activities.
1. The Value of Trading Cards
In the late 1990s, classes of plaintiffs tested interpretations of
value when they sought damages from trading card companies for violating gambling laws. Plaintiffs’ theory was that children buying
Pokémon cards or baseball trading cards were buying packs of cards
without knowing their contents.182 By paying money to open these
card packs, the children were hoping to acquire rare cards that would
enhance their play with friends, but that also could fetch high prices in
secondary marketplaces given the artificial scarcity designed by the
trading card companies.183 In order to recover, however, plaintiffs had
to prove they suffered injury; in these cases, they argued such injury
was the gambling losses incurred from playing these games of
chance.184
The majority of courts dismissed these claims under the theory
that the plaintiffs got the benefit of their bargain.185 They paid money
to receive a pack of cards. Although the plaintiffs may not have gotten
the valuable, rare cards they wanted, they nevertheless received some
assortment of cards. And thus, they received something of value that
181 People v. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (City Magis. Ct. 1939) (“It was never essential to
constitute a lottery that the prizes should be in money. . . . [I]t will be equally so although the
prizes are payable in lands or in chattels.”); see Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union v. Davis,
981 P.2d 990, 996 (Cal. 1999) (finding that “ ‘[p]rize’ encompasses property that the operator
offers to distribute”).
182 See David M. Halbfinger, Suit Claims Pokémon is Lottery, Not Just Fad, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/24/nyregion/suit-claims-pokemon-is-lotterynot-just-fad.html [https://perma.cc/W7NV-H3R5] (describing Pokémon card packs and gambling
theory); Patrice O’Shaugnessy, Lawsuit Is in the Cards, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 8, 1996, 12:00
AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/lawsuit-cards-article-1.746692 [https://
perma.cc/T6G5-J6V9] (describing several lawsuits filed against baseball trading card companies).
183 See Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 967 F. Supp. 405, 413 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (recognizing
that value of cards is readily ascertainable due to cash value on secondary market).
184

See id. at 414.

See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2002); Price v.
Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 607 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Dumas v. Major League
Baseball Props., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223–24 (S.D. Cal. 2000); see also Rodriguez v. Topps
Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1228, 1230–31 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
185
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justified their purchase.186 Unfortunately, the courts never answered
the key question of whether these card packs constituted gambling;
instead, they dismissed these cases for lack of injury.187 But what the
courts did recognize was that even thin cardboard rectangles imbued
with colorful pictures had sufficient real-world value to give plaintiffs
the benefit of their bargain.188 While this does not squarely answer the
question of how to valuate loot box rewards, it illustrates the relatively low bar of value.
2. The Value of Wagers
Some courts have also employed a wager theory to the prize/
value element, requiring that the prize is of greater value than the
consideration.189 For example, a line of cases found that vending machines that would randomly award consumers with prizes in addition
to the intended purchase constituted a gambling activity.190 Because
the original consideration was commensurate with the originally desired item from the vending machine,191 any chance reward above that
consideration met the prize/value element because its value automatically was greater than the consideration paid for the desired item.
Most recently, this logic was applied in George v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,192 in which the Indiana Supreme Court held that
a lottery system for collegiate basketball tickets was not a gambling
activity.193 In that case, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) held a lottery to distribute a limited supply of collegiate
basketball tickets in which thousands of people would submit the primary-market value of the ticket to enter the lottery.194 Only winners
that were randomly selected, however, would receive a ticket and
would thus forfeit the entry fee for the lottery; the so-called “losers”
See Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1087.
Id.
188 See generally supra note 185 and accompanying text.
189 See, e.g., Collins v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (RIA) 557, 568 (1992) (“[A] gain from a wagering transaction means the amount won [is] over the amount bet; it implies that there was a prior
wager.”).
190 See Commonwealth v. Gritten, 202 S.W. 884, 885 (Ky. 1918) (holding chewing gum slot
machine was gambling device for randomizing rewards). But see Commonwealth v. Irwin, 636
A.2d 1106, 1107–08 (Pa. 1993) (holding that electronic blackjack, poker, and other game machines were not gambling machines because tokens won were carefully calculated by computer
to require more to be spent playing than value of prizes that could be redeemed).
191 See Gritten, 202 S.W. at 885.
192 945 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 2011).
193 Id. at 152.
194 Id.
186
187
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would receive a refund.195 The court held that awarding these tickets
was insufficient to constitute a “prize” because the value of a ticket
was equal to the entry price of the lottery.196 There was no true “wager” to receive something of greater fair-market value than what was
invested through the original consideration.197 Even though there was
a robust secondary market in which these tickets could be sold for
higher prices, the court was unwilling to subject the NCAA to gambling regulations based on a secondary market out of its control.198
This wager theory heavily relies on real-world value, measuring
both the value of consideration and the value of the prize. Also, if this
wager theory were applied to loot boxes and virtual goods, it is unlikely that courts would rely on illicit secondary market prices as a
determinant of legitimate real-world value.
3. The Value of Virtual Tokens
Another line of gambling cases considered whether winning “free
plays” could fulfill the prize/value element. These cases often dealt
with a slot machine or other electronic gambling device that did not
reward players with a traditional prize but merely the opportunity to
win tokens that could be used to play the game again in a constant
gameplay loop. Courts have reached mixed results in these cases.199
Some courts used the cash out rule to reason that because these tokens cannot be exchanged for money or prizes, they cannot fulfill the
prize/value element.200 But sister courts have disagreed, finding that
such tokens were indeed “things of value” because they allowed the
player to continue the “privilege of playing” the game.201 Normally,
such games are pay-to-play, meaning there is a buy-in (even as little as
Id.
Id. at 152, 160.
197 Id.; see also State v. Turlington, 204 S.W. 821, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918) (interpreting
Missouri gambling law to require prizes to be more valuable than amount originally invested).
198 George, 945 N.E.2d at 159–60.
199 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing several federal
courts that have reached different results in “free to play” cases due to interpretation of different
state laws).
200 See, e.g., Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 731, 739–41 (N.D.
Ill. 2016) (finding that winning virtual chips in a casino game simulator merely gave players an
opportunity to play again by winning more chips that could be used in a loop to play more
games, not necessarily to win a thing of value).
201 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. 1983)
(holding that rewarding free games constituted a thing of value); Score Fam. Fun Ctr., Inc. v.
Cnty. of San Diego, 275 Cal. Rptr. 358, 359–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“A reward of extended play
by a video game for winning is a ‘thing of value’ within the meaning of the Penal Code
definition.”).
195
196
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a quarter) to play the game; thus, tokens won by a player subsidized
the player’s own monetary contribution to continue playing the game,
regardless of whether the tokens themselves lacked pecuniary value.202
This logic led the Ninth Circuit to hold that virtual casino chips
were indeed things of value in Kater v. Churchill Downs, Inc.203 Like
in the scenario above, players gambled in a virtual casino game and
had the opportunity to win virtual chips, which could in turn be used
to continue playing these games without having to spend more realworld money. The court held that these virtual chips had sufficient
value to fulfill the prize/value element.204 The Fourth Circuit, however,
contrasted this logic in Mason v. Machine Zone, Inc.205 when deciding
a case involving Game of War: Fire Age. In Game of War, players
could spend real-world money to buy virtual gold, and then in another
transaction spend that virtual gold to buy virtual chips used to spin a
prize wheel awarding virtual goods.206 These virtual goods could not
be redeemed for money; instead, they were only useful inside the virtual world.207 Relying on the cash-out rule, the court held that spinning the virtual wheel could not be gambling because real-world
money was not at stake and could not be won or lost.208 Soto v. Sky
Union, LLC209 is another case that invoked the cash out rule, holding
that the mobile game Castle Clash did not contain gambling elements.210 In that game, players had the option to use real-world money
to purchase “gems” that could be spent on a virtual game that would
randomly reward players with a new hero.211 Although some players
spent as much as $3,000 every day purchasing gems with the hopes of
obtaining valuable new heroes,212 the court held that this was not gambling because there was no way of redeeming gems or heroes for realworld money.213 Despite the presence of a robust secondary market in
202 See, e.g., Bullseye Distrib. LLC v. State Gambling Comm’n, 110 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that points awarded by electronic vending machine were a “thing of
value” because they extend the “privilege of playing the game without charge”).
203 886 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2018).
204 See id. at 787.
205 851 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2017).
206 See id. at 317–18.
207 See id. at 318.
208 See id. at 319. Further, the presence of a secondary market to sell entire Game of War
accounts—as opposed to individual virtual goods—was unpersuasive to the court. See id. at 320.
209 159 F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
210 See id. at 880.
211 See id. at 875.
212 Id. at 876.
213 See id. at 880.
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which Castle Clash players could sell their entire accounts based on
the valuable heroes in their roster, the court was unconvinced that this
conferred real-world value on the individual rewards at stake in the
randomized game.214
The consensus is clear; no matter what the outcome, the game, or
the context, courts heavily rely on real-world value and the cash-out
rule in assessing the prize/value element. But these cases, especially
those involving virtual rewards, make the mistake of assuming that
goods can only have real-world import if they can be converted into
real-world money. This narrow view of value ignores the economic
consensus that social, expressive, and utility perceived values drive
consumer and gambling behavior in the virtual world. If state gambling laws do not update with the times to understand these new realities, video game mechanics, like loot boxes, can and will lead to the
same negative externalities that traditional gambling laws have sought
to mitigate.
B. The Regulatory Landscape of Gambling Activities
Courts are in the unique position to interpret the prize/value element under state law in a way that fully embraces this new digital age.
But courts only play one part in a larger regulatory machine that mitigates gambling harms. Once an activity is deemed to be gambling—by
a court or other public decisionmaker—state gambling commissions
often operationalize how that activity should be regulated. This can
run the gamut between full prohibition to light restrictions.215 This
spectrum of regulation borrows from several other industries that produce potentially dangerous products, like the alcohol and tobacco industries.216 These frameworks do not seek to eliminate these goods
and services as legitimate pastimes, but merely seek to mitigate social
harms and protect vulnerable groups.217
The regulatory landscape of gambling in the United States is vast
but can be summarized under several categories, such as limits on age,
advertising, physical location, fairness in gameplay, monetary considSee id.
See Langvardt, supra note 42, at 153 (describing a broad range of regulatory options
including “[l]ight-touch responses,” as opposed to prohibition, that help consumers make better
decisions).
216 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 13, 16–17 (comparing gambling regulatory approach to
alcohol and tobacco industries).
217 See JOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING 83 (2001)
(“The most widely discussed problems with Internet gambling fall into three categories: gambling disorders, especially among young people; crime; and burdens on government.”).
214
215
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eration, and exemptions.218 Placing limitations on age is meant to prevent children from engaging in gambling activity because they are too
young to appreciate the financial and psychological risks fully. Multiple studies have shown that when children are introduced to addictive
gambling activities at a young age, they are more likely to exhibit
problem-gambling behavior as an adult.219 Consequently, the legal
gambling age in the majority of states is between eighteen and twentyone depending on the gambling activity.220 Limitations on advertising
are closely related to these concerns, with many states restricting
when, where, and how gambling providers can advertise their business.221 These gambling advertisements may be restricted so that they
cannot target minors222 and cannot be misleading when portraying
gambling odds or chances of winning.223
States also seek to control gambling activities through licensing
procedures that determine who can provide gambling services and
where they can be provided.224 Much like state and local procedures
that award businesses liquor licenses, gambling establishments must
also adhere to this cost of doing business.225 Not only does it cost
218 See DAVID MIERS, REGULATING COMMERCIAL GAMBLING 338–39, 344 (2004) (discussing goals of gambling regulation “to control ‘what gambling products and services may be offered to whom, by whom, at what price, in what areas, in what venues, at what times, and how
these products and services may be marketed’ ” (quoting PETER COLLINS, GAMBLING AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (2003))); Gabaldon, supra note 157, at 251–52 (outlining several different
overlapping regulatory models in the United States, including licenses, time and place restrictions, restricting clientele, and others); George G. Fenich, A Chronology of (Legal) Gaming in
the U.S., 3 GAMING RSCH. & REV. J. 65, 65, 71–76 (1996) (listing various state gambling laws
passed before 1995).
219 See, e.g., Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and
the Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 342 (1995) (finding that teenagers that participate in gambling activity
may be three times more likely than adults to become problem gamblers).
220 See Legal Gambling Age in the US, GAMBLING.COM, https://www.gambling.com/us/laws/
legal-gambling-age-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/XLR8-YQZF] (recording legal age for various
gambling activity in every state, along with specific state regulations on age limitations).
221 See generally AM. GAMING ASS’N, RESPONSIBLE GAMING: REGULATIONS AND STATUTES (2019) [hereinafter RESPONSIBLE GAMING], https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/09/AGA-Responsible-Gaming-Regs-Book_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H746TCR2] (highlighting dozens of state statutes and regulations limiting advertising).
222 See id. at 4 (stating that states may impose advertising restrictions prohibiting advertising that targets minors).
223 See, e.g., id. at 8, 13, 65, 146 (highlighting laws of Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, and Nevada, among others, that prohibit misleading advertising regarding gaming operations and chances at winning).
224 Gabaldon, supra note 157, at 251.
225 See id. at 251–52 (outlining general state-law licensing requirements). See generally RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 221 (describing licensing requirements and restrictions in dozens
of states).
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money to apply for these licenses, but there are ongoing duties to
maintain that license, including special taxes, physical inspections, and
other monitoring to ensure compliance with state and local gambling
laws.226 Many states also prohibit where bets can be placed by limiting
the use of mobile phones.227 This ensures that bets are placed within
the actual physical location where gambling activity can be supervised.228 And many local governments exercise their zoning powers to
control where physical gambling establishments can operate.229 This
ensures that gambling establishments like casinos—as opposed to the
corner liquor store that sells lottery tickets—do not bleed into neighborhoods that might indirectly trigger gambling behavior in a family
environment.
These ongoing licensing requirements overlap with various compliance protocols to ensure that gambling activities are sufficiently fair
and not deceptive or predatory. For example, slot machines are required to display their odds,230 and slot machine payouts are carefully
audited by third-party monitors.231 Many states also place limits on the
amount of alcohol that can be served to induce or incentivize people
to continue gambling.232 Many states have also required gambling
See AM. GAMING ASS’N, STATE OF THE STATES 2019: THE AGA SURVEY OF THE COMCASINO INDUSTRY 8–15 (2019) [hereinafter STATE OF THE STATES], https://
www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/AGA-2019-State-of-theStates_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X75V-GMQG] (overviewing state law requirements for licenses and compliance issues with state law); Darren A. Prum & Shannon Bybee, Commercial
Casino Gaming in the United States: A Jurisdictional Analysis of Gaming Taxes, Licenses, and
Fees, 4 GAMING RSCH. & REV. J. 17, 17–32 (1999) (overviewing licensing, fees, and tax requirements of eleven states and the federal government); MICHAEL BELLETIRE, LEGISLATING AND
REGULATING CASINO GAMING: A VIEW FROM STATE REGULATORS 8–9 (1999), https://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/belletire.pdf [https://perma.cc/SKN3-JWZG] (outlining internal control systems of independent monitoring and self-reporting for casinos).
227 See STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 226, at 14.
228 See id.
229 See BELLETIRE, supra note 226, at 14 (acknowledging power of local government and
state officials to use zoning to control physical locations of casinos); see, e.g., RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 221, at 66 (citing Kansas statute limiting casinos to specified “gaming zones”);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5301.1(e) (2020) (outlining New York regulations for
providing zoning approvals for new casinos).
230 See, e.g., RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 221, at 32 (citing an example of a Florida
statute requiring odds to be posted on slot machines).
231 See, e.g., STATE OF NEVADA GAMING CONTROL BOARD, GAMING AUDIT PROCEDURES
MANUAL § Slot Revenue (2000).
232 See RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 221, at 4–6 (overviewing states that impose alcoholic beverage limitations in casinos); STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 226, at 8–12 (same
regarding restrictions on offering complimentary alcoholic beverages); see also Langvardt, supra
note 42, at 149 (describing “luck ambassadors” in casinos, which are employees that offer free
drinks, tickets, or other incentives to encourage weary gamblers to continue gambling).
226
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providers to offer spending limits to gamblers, which allow players to
set a limit on how much they want to spend before going down the
dangerous rabbit hole of being caught up in the adrenaline and
dopamine rush of gambling excitement.233 These spending limits are
closely related to limits on the type of spending allowed. Many states
prohibit gambling providers from extending lines of credit to gamblers
and also prohibit gamblers from using credit cards to fund overspending on gambling activities.234
One last trend to explore is a state’s exemptions to its gambling
laws. Several states have passed statutes that specifically exempt staterun gambling activities (such as lotteries) and charitable gambling activities (such as a church’s bingo night).235 States justify these exemptions because the gambling revenues from these activities are going
toward causes that society deems worthy and does not want to diminish revenues with costly regulations.236 Recently, a growing number of
states have also exempted the emerging trend of fantasy sports
leagues from gambling regulation, usually as the result of strong industry and lobbying efforts.237 In these cases, the tax revenue from
these expansive gambling markets hold too much benefit for the state
to subject them to many of the above limitations.238
Overviewing these targeted regulatory tools is necessary to understand what tools might work in a future that regulates loot boxes.
As will be explored in Parts III and IV, if loot boxes are to be consid233 See RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 221, at 4–6 (overviewing states that require casinos to offer wager and time limits to gamblers to help them self-control gambling behavior).
234 See id. (overviewing states that prohibit accepting credit payments or extending credit
to gamblers); STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 226, at 8–12 (same).
235 See Marie-Cecile O. Tidwell, John W. Welte, Grace M. Barnes & Behnam Dayanim,
Gambling Modes and State Gambling Laws: Changes from 1999 to 2011 and Beyond, 19 GAMING
L. REV. & ECON. 13, 15–17 (2015) (recognizing carveouts for charitable gambling activities like
bingo).
236 See, e.g., Wyoming Lottery Act, 9-17 WYO. CODE R. § 102 (LexisNexis 2021).
237 See State by State Betting in the USA, BETTINGUSA.COM, https://www.bettingusa.com/
states [https://perma.cc/R7TK-PCJY] (outlining and updating state legislative action that expressly allow sports betting and online fantasy sports gambling); 12 States Allow Online Sports
Betting—Which Will Be the 13th?, AWFUL ANNOUNCING (Aug. 3, 2020), https://awfulannouncing.com/gambling/12-states-allow-online-sports-betting-which-will-be-the-13th.html [https://
perma.cc/G3X5-N98X] (same).
238 See Francis Markham & Martin Young, “Big Gambling”: The Rise of the Global Industry-State Gambling Complex, 23 ADDICTION RSCH. & THEORY 1, 1 (2015) (arguing that gambling
regulation is driven by economic imperatives of state and private actors). See generally Matthew
Vaz, “The News from Brooklyn is Distributing”: Corruption, Big-City Police, and the Dilemma of
Gambling, in ALL IN: THE SPREAD OF GAMBLING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 17,
19 (Jonathan D. Cohen & David G. Schwartz eds., 2018) (explaining gambling prohibition has
been more a story of politics, corruption, and monetary gain rather than paternalistic morality).
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ered a gambling activity under substantive state law, narrowly tailored
regulatory tools must be considered to achieve the desired mitigation
of harms specific to loot boxes.
III. A BRIDGE BETWEEN WORLDS: VALUATING VIRTUAL PRIZES
IN LOOT BOXES
[W]here your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
—Matthew 6:21239
The growing trend of loot boxes has only recently been met with
a growing trend of litigation, asking foreign and domestic courts to
consider whether loot boxes should be deemed a gambling activity.240
The main challenge for courts has been navigating how to treat such
virtual goods under “antiquated statutes and interpretations.”241 Using
the lens of perceived value, this Part argues why loot boxes should be
considered gambling, and why the broader acknowledgment of perceived value is necessary to assess the societal ills they bring. Apart
from arguing for substantive legal change, this Part also relies on the
most recent social science literature that bolsters the tremendous
overlap between gambling design and loot boxes, which often lead to
similar negative externalities.
A. Loot Boxes as Gambling: The Substantive Law
If the law is properly updated to appreciate perceived virtual
value, loot boxes should be identified by courts as a gambling activity.
The consideration element is fulfilled when a player spends real-world
money to purchase a loot box.242 But as case law provides, even nonmonetary participation can fulfill the consideration element.243 This
might include developers seeking to lure new players by offering free
loot boxes as a promotional event, or to entice existing players to conMatthew 6:21 (King James).
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Ramirez v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 20-cv-05672, 2021 WL
843184 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2021) (class action alleging FIFA card packs violate California’s gambling laws); Class Action Complaint for Consumer Fraud and Unjust Enrichment, Zajonc v.
Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 20-cv-07871 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 9, 2020) (class action alleging EA uses AI
technology to unfairly adjust gameplay difficulty to induce loot box purchases). As of the writing
of this Article, there are also fifteen pending cases in France alleging similar gambling allegations
from EA’s unregulated sale of FIFA card packs. See Islem Sharouda, More than 15 Lawsuits
Filed Against FIFA 20 in France, GAMEREACTOR (Mar. 9, 2020, 3:28 PM), https://www.game
reactor.eu/more-than-15-lawsuits-filed-against-fifa-20-in-france/ [https://perma.cc/H7GZ-4DC3].
241 John T. Holden, Trifling and Gambling with Virtual Money, 25 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 41,
41 (2018).
242 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
239
240
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tinue playing.244 By paying for the loot box or by giving some benefit
to developers through participation in loot box promotions, players
are fulfilling the consideration element of gambling.245 This consideration element would also extend to closed virtual economies in which
players could spend the virtual currency they earn in the game to
purchase loot boxes. Although real-world money is not penetrating
the magic circle, scholars have found that these closed-economy loot
box purchases still trigger the same psychological reward centers in
the brain as traditional gambling activity.246
The chance element that measures a player’s ability to change the
outcome of a game would not be triggered for Monopoly or poker,
but the RRMs in loot boxes fit the necessary requirements. Loot
boxes are more like slot machines or sweepstake contests and less like
Monopoly or poker games in that there is nothing a player can do
through skill, strategy, or calculating odds to influence the outcome of
the game.247 When a player opens a loot box, they receive a virtual
reward based solely on complex algorithms that determine payouts of
rare virtual goods.248
The prize/value element is the determining factor of whether
courts will identify loot boxes as gambling activity. Under the prevailing cash-out rule, it is unlikely that loot boxes would be considered
gambling activity with the exception of those in open virtual economies.249 Because open virtual economies allow players to freely exchange and liquidate virtual goods for real-world money, they closely
244 These free promotional offers are similar to the “luck ambassadors” employed by the
gambling industry. See Langvardt, supra note 42, at 149 (describing “luck ambassadors” in casinos, which are employees that offer free drinks, tickets, or other incentives to encourage weary
gamblers to continue gambling).
245 See Leon Y. Xiao, Which Implementations of Loot Boxes Constitute Gambling? A UK
Legal Perspective on the Potential Harms of Random Reward Mechanisms, INT’L J. MENTAL
HEALTH & ADDICTION (Aug. 24, 2020), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11469020-00372-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7M6-2ZYG] (arguing that loot boxes cause sufficient psychological harm to be regulated, regardless of whether they cost real-world money or whether they
reward virtual goods with real-world value).
246 See David Zendle, Paul Cairns, Herbie Barnett & Cade McCall, Paying for Loot Boxes
Is Linked to Problem Gambling, Regardless of Specific Features Like Cash-Out and Pay-to-Win,
102 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 181, 190 (2020) (finding that exposure to loot boxes when spending
money on them, or in a “cash out” open virtual economy, is correlated with problem gambling
behavior); see also Xiao, supra note 245 (arguing that loot boxes, even in closed virtual economies where there is no “cash out” option, still carry enough psychological harm to justify regulating them as gambling).
247 See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
249 Moshirnia, supra note 23, at 77 (arguing that loot boxes are “unlikely to meet the legal
requirements of gambling” in part because “all items offered have no tangible value”).
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resemble a casino that allows gamblers to cash out their chips at the
end of a play session.250 The same is not true of closed and hybrid
economies. Players cannot cash out.251 Some have argued that the robust but illegitimate secondary marketplace serves as a de facto cashout option.252 But it is unlikely that the costly weight and liability of
gambling regulations will be levied against developers based on an
illegitimate marketplace that they contractually prohibit in their
EULAs.253
This is why perceived value is so important to the question of loot
box regulation. It bridges the gap between real-world regulation
(which seeks to mitigate the social costs that arise from consumer engagement with gambling) and virtual world realities (where perceived
value explains consumer engagement with virtual goods). The most
cutting-edge social-science research confirms that players buy loot
boxes for the perceived value of prizes, not for real-world pecuniary
gain.254 When it comes to social value, studies have demonstrated that
players spend money to acquire virtual goods that increase their social
standing and relationships with their friends in online communities.255
Other studies have confirmed the importance of expressive value,
with at least one finding that increased self-presentation and expression in the virtual world is another primary purchasing motivator.256
Following this pattern, studies have also confirmed that the utility
value of virtual goods, which empowers the player to progress in the
250 See Balkin, supra note 47, at 95 (hypothesizing that a casino in a virtual world that
allows players to directly cash out winnings is a loophole in online gambling restrictions).
251

See GAO REPORT, supra note 79, at 4–6.

See Nielsen & Grabarczyk, supra note 33, at 198; see also supra note 197 and accompanying text.
252

253

See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.

Yue Guo & Stuart J. Barnes, Explaining Purchasing Behavior within World of Warcraft,
52 J. COMPUT. INFO. SYS. 18, 24, 28 (2012) (finding that perceived value had the strongest influence on purchasing decisions, followed by social status conferred by a virtual good).
254

255 See Juho Hamari, Kati Alha, Simo Järvelä, J. Matias Kivikangas, Jonna Koivisto &
Janne Paavilainen, Why Do Players Buy In-Game Content? An Empirical Study on Concrete
Purchase Motivations, 68 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 538, 543 (2017) (providing an overview of
psychological literature establishing that “[s]ocial motivations have been deemed to be one of
the main categories of motivations for purchases of . . . virtual goods”).
256 See, e.g., Hee-Woong Kim, Hock Chuan Chan & Atreyi Kankanhalli, What Motivates
People to Purchase Digital Items on Virtual Community Websites? The Desire for Online SelfPresentation, 23 INFO. SYS. RSCH. 1232, 1233–35, 1242 (2012) (outlining consumption literature
showing the importance of self-presentation in consumer decisions); see also Yue Guo & Stuart
Barnes, Purchase Behavior in Virtual Worlds: An Empirical Investigation in Second Life, 48
INFO. & MGMT. 303, 310–12 (2011) (studying consumer purchases of aesthetic items that improve avatar’s individuality and uniqueness).
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game, is also an important motivating factor for buying and gambling
for virtual goods.257
This understanding of perceived value confirms that players are
indeed receiving a prize of value, but more specifically of virtual value.
This contribution helps to properly identify loot boxes as a gambling
activity and also responds to a chief critique. Developers have often
argued that their loot boxes cannot be considered gambling because
players cannot lose like they can in a gambling activity. Just like in the
Pokémon and baseball card litigations of the 1990s,258 the industry has
argued that regardless of the consideration and chance elements of
gambling, “the player is always guaranteed to receive in-game content” just as in “collectible card games.”259 Slot machines and other
gambling games, they might argue, require not only the possibility of
winning, but also the possibility of walking away with nothing. But it is
indeed possible to lose if the virtual perceived value is useless. Given
the RRMs in loot boxes, low value items are distributed quite often,
with high value items being distributed rarely.260 Therefore, players
are often rewarded with low value items that have little social, expressive, or utility value and might even be rewarded with duplicate items
that they already own.261 In other words, receiving a virtual good that
a player already owns, or a virtual good that has inferior social, expressive, or utility value to goods they already own is useless to that
player. These items are often discarded, thrown away, or abandoned
in the virtual world. From a behavioral point of view, this causes the
same addictive problems as gambling. Players perceive this as a loss,
and as a result, continue to compulsively spend money buying loot
boxes to chase after the “big win.”262 Thus, players often lose when
257 See Hamari et al., supra note 255, 541–44; Pui-Lai To, Chechen Liao & Tzu-Hua Lin,
Shopping Motivations on Internet: A Study Based on Utilitarian and Hedonic Value, 27
TECHNOVATION 774, 781–84 (2007) (finding that utility value was positively related to intention
to buy items, but acknowledging no impact for buying purely hedonic items); FTC Workshop,
supra note 70, at 126 (statement of Professor Andrey Simonov) (discussing that progressing in a
game is an important motivator to purchase loot boxes).
258

See Halbfinger, supra note 182.

See Jason Schreier, ESRB Says It Doesn’t See ‘Loot Boxes’ as Gambling, KOTAKU (Oct.
11, 2017, 12:46 PM), https://kotaku.com/esrb-says-it-doesnt-see-loot-boxes-as-gambling1819363091 [https://perma.cc/H26E-KQK6].
259

260

Cf. Drummond & Sauer, supra note 2, at 530.

See AUSTL. SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 20 (noting that players can “lose” when
purchasing loot boxes by receiving worthless or duplicate items, or items for which sale on the
secondary market would not garner return of consideration paid for the loot box).
261

See id.; see also Per Binde, Gambling, Exchange Systems, and Moralities, 21 J. GAMSTUD. 445, 467 (2005) (describing “Big Win” psychological trigger of lotteries).
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buying loot boxes because of the inferior perceived value of the most
common rewards.
The consensus of several social-science studies and the developing literature on virtual goods and loot boxes support a clear conclusion: people are spending real-world money on loot boxes for the
hope of winning a prize of perceived value.263 This emerging body of
research proves that the cash-out rule cannot fully account for behavior in the virtual world.264 And when state gambling laws that were
written for a past generation cannot keep up with today’s realities, it is
time they be properly updated.
B. Loot Boxes as Gambling: The Value of the Prize
The perceived value that drives virtual markets is further evidenced by the evolution of virtual goods becoming a commodity currency in some virtual worlds. There are several different types of
currency, including commodities like gold, from which the exchange
value is derived from the value of the commodity based on natural or
artificial scarcity within that marketplace.265 In this sense, even cigarettes could serve as a form of currency, as they have served in prisoner of war camps,266 because they have all the necessary features of
being an acceptable medium of exchange.267 So while money and
value are indeed different concepts practically, things of value can actually become money under interesting circumstances.
As virtual worlds have evolved, so too have their monetary
schemes. In what might seem like a prehistoric era in virtual history,
one community traded virtual chairs as a form of currency when there
was no other medium of exchange.268 In today’s virtual worlds, while
there is indeed virtual in-game money that can be used, players still
See, e.g., Drummond & Sauer, supra note 2, at 532.
See id. This is also true for many gamblers, which studies have showed do not always
gamble for pecuniary gain, but also for the enjoyment, emotional arousal, escapism, and
dopamine rush. See generally Andrew Brady & Garry Prentice, Are Loot Boxes Addictive? Analyzing Participant’s Physiological Arousal While Opening a Loot Box, 16 GAMES & CULTURE
419 (2019) (citing R.I.F. Brown, Arousal and Sensation-Seeking Components in the General Explanation of Gambling and Gambling Addictions, 21 INT’L J. ADDICTIONS 1001, 1001–16 (1986)).
265 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 179, 184.
266 See Boon Seng Tan & Kin Yew Low, Bitcoin—Its Economics for Financial Reporting, 27
AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 220, 221 (2017).
267 See Joseph M. Ostroy & Ross M. Starr, The Transactions Role of Money, in 1 HANDBOOK OF MONETARY ECONOMICS (Benjamin M. Friedman & Frank H. Hahn eds., 1990) (highlighting ideal characteristics of good forms of currency).
268 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 177–78 (describing virtual community in Habbo Hotel exchanging chairs as a type of currency in virtual bartering transactions).
263
264
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exchange gifts and even barter with one another using virtual goods.
The fact that developers often prohibit sales of items on a secondary
market, yet allow players to transfer items amongst themselves, shows
the true intent of developers to allow such gift/bartering transactions.
And even though they occur in the virtual world without any “cashout” ability, giving gifts of significance and bartering for goods and
services is a clear indication of perceived value.
In the more sophisticated virtual world of Counter Strike: Global
Offensive (“CS:GO”), virtual goods are even used in gambling transactions.269 These transactions are referred to as “skin gambling,” using
artistic and aesthetic designs that can be used to customize the appearance of avatars and their weapons as consideration and prizes in gambling transactions.270 Before players face off in battle, players
participating and those on the sidelines will wager skins of differing
value based on their aesthetics and scarcity.271 And after the match,
like in a sports betting wager, the victor collects the spoils as a prize.272
Indeed, the use of loot box contents and other virtual goods to gamble
is an emerging behavior in gaming. Players could wager money, or
even virtual dollars or gold, but instead they have assigned even more
desirable value to the aesthetic skins at play.273 This is yet another
example of how players assign value to virtual goods; a good transforming into a form of currency is a hallmark example of assessing its
value.274
The literature highlights the key role of trading virtual goods in
establishing their monetary value.275 As the CS:GO community shows,
not only are virtual goods given as mere gifts to improve social relaSee Holden & Ehrlich, supra note 151, at 566.
See GROVE, supra note 153, at 2–3 (providing an overview of what skins are and their
purpose in the video game industry). See generally Hardenstein, supra note 153 (arguing that
CS:GO skin betting should be regulated as gambling because skins are used as consideration in
gambling transactions).
271 See GROVE, supra note 153, at 2.
272 Id.
273 See Macey & Hamari, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that skins have replaced real-world
currency in CS:GO gambling transactions).
274 See Joshua Brustein & Eben Novy-Williams, Game-Maker Valve Moves to Choke off
$7.4 Billion Gambling Market, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2016, 6:18 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/game-maker-valve-moves-to-choke-off-7-4-billion-gambling-market [https://perma.cc/3PAQ-W5AD] (reporting that skin gambling was worth
over $7 billion before game developer stepped in to curb its practice); see also Ryan Haar, Why
Do Bitcoins Have Value?, TIME: NEXTADVISOR (Sept. 7, 2021), https://time.com/nextadvisor/
investing/cryptocurrency/why-do-bitcoins-have-value [https://perma.cc/2CVB-T5NL].
275 Donghee Yvette Wohn, Spending Real Money: Purchasing Patterns of Virtual Goods in
an Online Social Game, in CHI ‘14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN
269
270
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tionships between friends, they are also bartered as a commodity currency in gambling transactions. If consumers are openly bartering with
goods or transferring these virtual goods in exchange for services, this
actually shows the tremendous monetary value they have.276 And if
people are willing to gamble for and with these virtual goods, this is
tantamount to a prima facie case for why these items have value.
C. Loot Boxes as Gambling: The Social Costs
Perceived value helps clarify why people spend money on loot
boxes, and the results are beginning to mirror the very behavior that
traditional gambling regulations seek to mitigate. David Zendle and
Paul Cairns have authored several studies that have found a statistically significant “link between loot box spending and problem gambling.”277 In fact, when examining the relevance of “cashing out,”
Zendle and Cairns found that “cashing in” was a more significant factor that correlated with problem gambling.278 In other words, the
amount of real-world money spent to purchase loot boxes in a hybrid
virtual economy had a higher statistical link to problem gambling than
a player’s ability to cash out in an open virtual economy.279 This has
led some scholars to question whether the real-world value of virtual
goods is a strong motivator for betting on loot boxes at all.280
This link between loot boxes and problem gambling behavior has
produced many of the same troubling effects. Children in particular
are especially vulnerable to the loot box craze. They are the quintessential example of why a cash-out rule makes little sense when regulating loot boxes. Children do not seek to cash out prizes from loot
boxes; instead, they value these prizes according to how they might
enhance their social, expressive, or utility value in the virtual world.281
As just a few anecdotal examples illustrate, the issue of loot boxes is
not just one of gambling but of child protection from developing risky
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3359, 3363 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1145/2556288.2557074
[https://perma.cc/CP7Y-PC4R]; Hamari et al., supra note 255, at 541–44.
276 For example, popular games like Rocket League, EVE Online, and Path of Exile do not
officially allow players to “cash-out” virtual winnings and goods but allow players to trade and
transfer virtual items amongst themselves. See Xiao, supra note 245 (discussing trading versus
“cash-out” systems).
277 See Zendle et al., supra note 246, at 190.
278 See id. at 188.
279 See id. (finding that “cash-out” feature was still correlated with problem gambling but at
a lower correlation ratio than “cash-in” feature).
280 See Xiao, supra note 245.
281 See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GAMBLING
INDUSTRY, supra note 35, at 113–14.
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spending habits. For example, a seventeen-year-old spent nearly
$8,000 on his father’s credit card buying card packs in FIFA.282 In another sports video game, a sixteen-year-old spent £2,000, and his parents did not realize the extent of this spending habit until they tried to
use their credit card and it was declined.283 A twelve-year-old spent
£700 on the Clash of Clans mobile game,284 and a child as young as
seven years old spent $6,000 on a Jurassic Park mobile game.285 Some
families even admitted that their children’s unmonitored loot box
spending forced them to remortgage their homes to cover the looming
debt.286 There are hundreds of such anecdotes serving as signposts all
along the internet superhighway, warning other players in virtual
worlds to be wary of these loot box hazards.
But troubling statistics show this problem goes further than mere
anecdotes. In a recent survey of several hundred children in the
United Kingdom, over one-third of respondents indicated that they
started buying loot boxes before they turned thirteen due to the lack
of age restrictions.287 A similar percentage admitted that they did not
realize how much money they were spending when purchasing loot
boxes,288 leading 13% of them to go into personal debt and 15% to
steal money from their parents.289 From a psychological perspective,
24% of children reported they believed they were addicted to loot
boxes and 44% reported they felt feelings of frustration and anger
more often buying loot boxes than they otherwise would have.290
This only bolsters developers’ strategies that incentivize them to
target children.291 By labelling loot boxes as mere entertainment,292
children are less capable of differentiating the game from the gam282 See Sarah Fields, Son Charges Dad’s Credit Card for $8,000 on FIFA Microtransactions,
GAMERANT (Jan. 11, 2016), https://gamerant.com/8000-fifa-microtransactions-charge/ [https://
perma.cc/FTP5-LTJP].
283 See Zoe Kleinman, ‘My Son Spent £3,160 in One Game,’ BBC NEWS (July 15, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48925623 [https://perma.cc/6Y2S-VYBB].
284 See id.
285 See Fields, supra note 282.
286 See GAMBLING HEALTH ALL., WHAT IS THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF LOOT BOXES ON
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE? 5.
287 Id. at 3.
288 Id. at 4.
289 Id. at 5.
290 Id. at 2.
291 See, e.g., Meyer et al., supra note 26 (noting industry pattern targeting children for inapp purchases). Recently, FIFA card packs were advertised in a children’s toy magazine, showing a clear targeting of young children to engage with these gambling mechanics. See Vikki
Blake, Fans Hit Out at EA for Promoting FIFA Microtransactions in Magazines for Children,
EUROGAMER (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2020-09-27-fans-hit-out-at-ea-
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bling.293 Children also do not have the same cognitive or social appreciation of the amount of money—usually belonging to their parents—
that they spend on loot boxes.294 Further, studies have found a troubling negative correlation between age and likelihood to spend money
buying virtual goods.295 This means that the younger a player is, the
more likely they are to spend money on loot boxes.296 Gambling studies corroborate these worrisome conclusions, finding that teenagers
are three times more likely to become problem gamblers than adults
when exposed to gambling activities due to the unique stage of
neuroplasticity of teenage cognitive development that forms stronger
associative bonds in the brain.297 Given the growing consensus linking
loot boxes to problem gambling behavior and the staggering statistic
that over one-fifth of the American video gaming player base are
under eighteen years old,298 regulating loot boxes is an issue of generational importance.
Although protecting children from these gaming or gambling
habits is a priority, adults are also suffering from problematic gambling behavior. Take for example the thirty-two-year-old who spent
$10,000 on FIFA card packs,299 or the nineteen-year-old that spent a
for-promoting-fifa-microtransactions-in-magazines-for-children [https://perma.cc/QM6FGEAM].
292 The video game industry has taken efforts to label games with gambling mechanics
through a rating system, which has proven to have little effect on limiting children’s access to
them. See Ratings Guide, ENT. SOFTWARE RATING BD., https://www.esrb.org/ratings-guide/
[https://perma.cc/SGT6-GGFF] (providing that a game will receive an “Adults Only 18+” rating
only if it contains “[r]eal [g]ambling . . . including betting or wagering real cash or currency”);
Erik Kain, The ESRB Is Wrong About Loot Boxes and Gambling, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2017, 7:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2017/10/12/the-esrb-is-wrong-about-loot-boxes-andgambling [https://perma.cc/GKQ5-YV65] (quoting ESRB denial to classify loot box sales as
gambling activity in ratings); Andrew Robertson, PEGI Rating for Gambling Descriptor Is Now
Always 18+, ASK ABOUT GAMES: VIDEO GAME NEWS (Sept. 1, 2021, 4:50 PM), https://
www.askaboutgames.com/news/pegi-rating-for-gambling-is-now-always-18 [https://perma.cc/
5PR2-VBJ3] (describing European video gaming rating system and its treatment of rating games
containing gambling elements).
293 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 59–60.
294 Id. at 63 (studying children’s inability to assess risk properly, which exacerbates gambling tendencies).
295 See Marc von Meduna, Fred Steinmetz, Lennart Ante, Jennifer Reynolds & Ingo Fiedler, Loot Boxes Are Gambling-Like Elements in Video Games with Harmful Potential: Results
from a Large-Scale Population Survey, 63 TECH. SOC’Y 1, 8 (2020).
296 See id.
297 See Gabaldon, supra note 157, at 259.
298 See ENT. SOFTWARE ASS’N, 2020 ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY
4 (2020), https://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Final-Edited-2020ESA_Essential_facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7H7-4C3X].
299 Yin-Poole, supra note 78.

2022]

PANDORA’S LOOT BOX

423

similar amount across several different mobile games.300 In one study,
such problem gamblers spent nearly ten times the amount on loot
boxes than the average player;301 the more severe a person’s problem
gambling is, the more money they spend on loot boxes.302 This relationship is unique to loot box spending because studies show that
problem gamblers do not overspend on other types of microtransactions; instead, they only exhibited strong compulsive spending when
purchasing loot boxes.303 This shows just how similar the neurological
triggers are between loot boxes and other gambling activities.
Although data connects loot boxes with problem gambling behavior, it is too early to prove causation; in other words, researchers
cannot yet prove that buying loot boxes causes problem gambling behavior.304 But research convincingly shows that the psychological triggers of loot boxes serve as a possible gateway into problem gambling
behavior.305 This wealth of evidence is what led Keith Whyte, the Executive Director of the National Council on Problem Gambling, to
conclude that “every study published to date on the connection between loot boxes and gambling has found an association” between
loot boxes and gambling problems.306
This is all by design. Loot boxes account for nearly one-fifth of
the video game industry’s profits and projected growth,307 which in300 Kellen Beck, 19-Year-Old Gambling Addict Lays Out a Case Against Video Game
Microtransactions, MASHABLE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/12/01/19-gaming-gambling-addict/ [https://perma.cc/5578-WKC7] (reporting that receipts from 2015 and 2016 showed
a nineteen-year-old man “spent around $10,000 on video game content, ranging from $0.99 to
$100 on games like Clash of Kings, Counter-Strike: Global Offensive, Hobbit: Kingdom of Middle-earth, Pokémon Go, and more”).
301 See David Zendle & Paul Cairns, Video Game Loot Boxes Are Linked to Problem
Gambling: Results of a Large-Scale Survey, PLOS ONE, Nov. 21, 2018, at 1, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0206767&type=printable [https://
perma.cc/PS7V-CCDP].
302 See id. at 6.
303 See id. at 7–8.
304 See Aaron Drummond, James D. Sauer & Lauren C. Hall, Loot Box Limit-Setting: A
Potential Policy to Protect Video Game Users with Gambling Problems?, 114 ADDICTION 935,
935–36 (2019).
305 See Drummond & Sauer, supra note 2, at 532 (finding that, because of similar psychological conditioning, loot boxes created a “ripe breeding ground” for problem gambling
behavior).
306 See FTC Workshop, supra note 70, at 188 (statement of Keith Whyte, Executive Director, National Council on Problem Gambling); see also Meduna et al., supra note 295, at 9 (finding strong correlation between players who engage in gambling activity and those who engage in
purchasing loot boxes, with up to 80% of loot box purchasers being categorized as problem
gamblers according to adjusted Problem Gambling Severity Index score).
307 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
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centivizes developers to expand user engagement even further.308 As
one industry insider admitted, these loot boxes are specifically designed to trigger the optimum dopamine rush to players, which plays
on the same neurological triggers that makes gambling so addictive.309
And when comparing this to the social costs of gambling—which includes devastating outcomes such as mental health conditions, financial issues, breakdowns of relationships, criminal activity, increased
substance abuse, and even suicide310—regulators must take necessary
action.
IV. CLOSING PANDORA’S LOOT BOX: DRAWING LINES
CREATING LIMITS

AND

The best way to predict the future is to create it.
—Abraham Lincoln311
308 For many tech companies incentivized to boost profits by increasing user engagement,
designing addictive technology is part of their business model. See Langvardt, supra note 42, at
134–36, 138 (discussing social media companies’ incentives to design addictive software); Vikram
R. Bhargava & Manuel Velasquez, Ethics of the Attention Economy: The Problem of Social
Media Addiction, 31 BUS. ETHICS Q. 321, 322 (2021) (arguing that such addictive software design
is unethical).
309 See Ali Jones, Desire, Competition, or Addiction—Why Do We Buy Loot Boxes?, PCGAMESN (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.pcgamesn.com/loot-boxes-gambling-addiction [https://
perma.cc/9393-HX6K] (“[E]very time you open a loot box, your situation is getting better, but
it’s getting better in unexpected ways, so that hits all the little cheap instant dopamine buttons.”
(quoting Luther Patenge, former developer who helped design loot box system)); see also
AUSTL. SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 35–36 (reviewing evidence that game designers are
looking at similar analytics to maximizing loot box monetization in the same way slot machine
and electronic poker machines have been studied).
310 See Nancy M. Petry, Yola Ammerman, Jaime Bohl, Anne Doersch, Heather Gay, Ronald Kadden, Cheryl Molina & Karen Steinberg, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Pathological
Gamblers, 74 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 555, 555 (2006) (finding that online gamblers
in general suffered from poor mental and physical health); Felicity K. Lorains, Sean Cowlishaw
& Shane A. Thomas, Prevalence of Comorbid Disorders in Problem and Pathological Gambling:
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Population Surveys, 106 ADDICTION 490, 490, 495
(2011); Jon E. Grant, Liana Schreiber, Brian L. Odlaug & Suck Won Kim, Pathological Gambling and Bankruptcy, 51 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 115, 115–18 (2010); Nicki Dowling,
David Smith & Trang Thomas, The Family Functioning of Female Pathological Gamblers, 7
INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION 29, 30–31 (2009); Rina Gupta & Jeffrey L. Derevensky,
An Empirical Examination of Jacob’s General Theory of Addictions: Do Adolescent Gamblers
Fit the Theory?, 14 J. GAMBLING STUD. 17, 23, 34, 41 (1998) (citing higher risks for crime and
delinquency amongst adolescents with problem gambling habit); Gabaldon, supra note 157, at
260 (noting documented increase in crime in places where gambling is legalized); Stephen C.
Newman & Angus H. Thompson, A Population-Based Study of the Association Between Pathological Gambling and Attempted Suicide, 33 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 80, 80–81,
86 (2003). See generally McGrody, supra note 28 (recounting stories of those who spent too
much money on microtransactions, including individuals who considered suicide).
311 DUSTIN HANSEN, GAME ON!: VIDEO GAME HISTORY FROM PONG AND PAC-MAN TO
MARIO, MINECRAFT, AND MORE 337 (2016) (attributing quote to Abraham Lincoln).
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Thus far, this Article has used the new valuation framework of
perceived virtual value to argue for the expansion of the prize/value
element in state gambling law to include loot boxes. But this is only
the first step. Once loot boxes are properly categorized as a gambling
activity by courts, the door opens for the full range of gambling regulation to penetrate the magic circle.312
If developers want to continue to sell loot boxes, they may do so
under the proper limitations. Like the current state of gambling, complete prohibition would be ineffective.313 Instead, developers would
have to take on additional costs to meet the new burdens that come
with running a gambling operation.314 Given the enormous revenue
generated by loot boxes,315 it is unlikely that these added burdens will
render the practice unprofitable. But if developers determine that
compliance is too costly, they can stop selling loot boxes. In countries
where loot boxes have been banned or regulated, developers have followed suit and disabled those game features.316 This weakens any argument that regulation would be so burdensome that it would be
practically or financially untenable for the industry.
This Part explores these possible regulations with the precision of
a scalpel as opposed to the brunt of a hammer.317 A framework that
differentiates loot boxes from traditional gambling regulation and
other technology industries is necessary in order to tailor regulatory
tools that minimize loot box harms but maximize their benefits for
industry growth and innovation.318 The nuanced balance between
312 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 88 (arguing for appropriate regulation of any particular
type of behavior that can be potentially harmful, including gambling).
313 Prohibition, especially in this context, is not a realistic or effective response. See, e.g.,
LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 149–50 (explaining follies of prohibition in
other economic contexts); Adrian Parke & Mark Griffiths, Why Internet Gambling Prohibition
Will Ultimately Fail, 8 GAMING L. REV. 295, 296 (2004) (arguing that prohibiting online gambling
is likely to fail because technology outpaces legislation).
314 See generally RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 221 (outlining dozens of states’ statutes
and regulations for licensing, advertisements, age-restrictions, spending limitations, and other
regulations on gambling businesses); STATE OF THE STATES supra note 226, at 8–15 (same).
315 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
316 See Hong, supra note 42, at 81 (recording different developers who altered games to
regulate loot boxes within certain jurisdictions).
317 See LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 8 (“[S]olutions that work in conventional economic design can be destructive if transported wholesale into virtual economy design, despite both being based on the same understanding of human behavior.”).
318 See Brett Abarbanel, Gambling vs. Gaming: A Commentary on the Role of Regulatory,
Industry, and Community Stakeholders in the Loot Box Debate, 22 GAMING L. REV. 231, 231
(2018) (“A successful regulatory policy will control risk while encouraging positive social behavior . . . .”); cf. Glen Atkinson, Mark Nichols & Ted Oleson, The Menace of Competition and
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these different considerations requires careful reliance on virtual economic realities to outline a regulatory framework that limits certain
types of loot boxes through several interventions.319
A. Building a Framework: The Unique Considerations of
Virtual Regulation
This Section considers the following three things when tailoring
regulations for loot boxes, all of which must be supported with sufficient, reliable, and persuasive evidence:320 (1) the problem; (2) the balancing; and (3) the solutions. By exploring these different phases of
regulatory design, this Section also addresses criticisms that do not
meet the burdens of evidence mentioned above.
The first step toward regulation is that there must be a problem
of sufficient size or scope that justifies the time and study of regulators. This promotes the economy and time of the regulatory decisionmaker. Advocates must present evidence to earn the necessary
attention to effect a change on society. If the purported problem does
not meet this initial threshold, industry or government regulators may
deem it unworthy of their time based on the minor scope of the problem, or the lack of evidence detailing the problem. This is one of the
biggest roadblocks for regulating loot boxes. Not enough decisionmakers understand the problem;321 not enough parents understand their children are at risk;322 and not enough adults understand
Gambling Deregulation, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 621, 621–22 (2000) (recognizing importance of identifying the type of behavior gambling regulators want to alter before issuing regulations).
319 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 32 (recognizing need for multiple interventions based
on multiple factors that underpin gambling behavior); see also id. at 142–44 (identifying spectrum of potential regulatory models).
320 Scholars and economists have explored many theories of regulation, including public
interest theories that seek to correct market failures; contract theories maintaining that private
orderings and litigation are more efficient; capture theories that argue regulations seek to benefit interest groups; and enforcement theories that regulations seek to impose social control
through distinct strategies. See Andrei Shleifer, Understanding Regulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT.
439, 440–45 (2005) (outlining theories of regulation).
321 See Am. Librs. Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting, in
cyberspace law case, that “[j]udges and legislators faced with adapting existing legal standards to
the novel environment of cyberspace struggle with terms and concepts that the average American five-year-old tosses about with breezy familiarity,” and that the case had “afforded [her] a
window into an entirely unknown world”); see, e.g., Chris Cillizza, How the Senate’s Tech Illiteracy Saved Mark Zuckerberg, CNN (Apr. 11, 2018, 3:58 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/10/
politics/mark-zuckerberg-senate-hearing-tech-illiteracy-analysis/index.html [https://perma.cc/
FJA5-QUCJ] (describing technical illiteracy of congress people while questioning tech decisionmakers); see also Bartle, supra note 128, at 31 (detailing game developers’ fears, that if regulators “don’t understand what they’re regulating, how can they hope to regulate it”).
322 See FTC Workshop, supra note 70, at 178 (statements of Patricia Vance, President, En-
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the video game industry’s size and impact. And while there have been
a small handful of politicians that have tried to shine light on the dark
practices of loot boxes,323 domestic politics has not budged.324 This is
in contrast with the dozens of special reports, legislative hearings, executive actions, and consumer lawsuits in the international
community.325
The era of ignoring loot boxes, however, will be short lived. Decisionmakers and regulators are starting to pay more attention to the
shifting tides of dark software design and addictive technologies.326
Congress has impaneled hearings because of the growing concern of
the dangers of social media.327 Popular media is starting to take notice
of these trends as well.328 We no longer live in a time, as our ancestors
did, when the goal of technological design was to enhance the human
experience by cutting down trees, crossing oceans, and entertaining
our imaginations. Instead, we are entering a dark new age where the
market has incentivized software design that seeks to control the
human experience by exploiting psychological weaknesses.329 Loot
tertainment Software Rating Board) (admitting that parents have “low awareness of what a loot
box is”); id. at 202–03 (statements of Ariel Fox Johnson, Senior Counsel, Common Sense Media)
(stating that many parents “do not realize that a kid has access to their credit card,” and they do
not know how to turn off in-app purchases or how to tell if a game requires them).
323 See Cillizza, supra note 321.
324 See LASTOWKA, supra note 11, at 70 (stating that technologies that are perceived to
threaten state power or social stability receive more attention from regulators, whereas entertainment technology is often seen as harmless).
325 See, e.g., Moshirnia, supra note 23, at 99–107; AUSTL. SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at
9–14 (detailing international attention drawn by loot boxes); see also supra note 240 and accompanying text.
326 See Cillizza, supra note 321 (although many congressmen do not fully understand the
problem, they nevertheless are holding hearings acknowledging that there is a problem of sufficient scope regarding social media that warrants their consideration).
327 See id.
328 See, e.g., THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Exposure Labs 2020) (exploring addictive design of
social media and its pernicious business model selling user data); see also Hilary Andersson,
Social Media Apps Are ‘Deliberately’ Addictive to Users, BBC NEWS (July 4, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/technology-44640959 [https://perma.cc/F45A-GAAZ] (documenting admissions from former Facebook executives explaining design features they invented to exploit weaknesses in human psychology); Olivia Solon, Ex-Facebook President Sean Parker: Site Made to
Exploit Human ‘Vulnerability,’ GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/09/facebook-sean-parker-vulnerability-brain-psychology [https://perma.cc/A4FT-26NV] (discussing Sean Parker’s admission that Facebook exploits human weakness by giving users dopamine hits).
329 See, e.g., ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE
9–10 (2020) (describing Facebook’s ethically dubious business model of using AI to keep users
engaged and nudging them in directions that Facebook wants them to go); Manoel Horta
Ribeiro, Raphael Ottoni, Robert West, Virgı́lio A. F. Almeida & Wagner Meira Jr., Auditing
Radicalization Pathways on YouTube, ARXIV (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.08313.pdf [https:/

428

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:376

boxes are merely one piece of this larger trend in dark patterns on the
web. This includes a variety of human-to-computer program interactions whereby a computer program can trick or confuse users to make
decisions against their own preferences,330 and can even induce compulsive or addictive online behavior.331 These dark patterns—bolstered by the use of behavioral analytics and big data—are already
being used in other industries. Online databases for shopping websites
collect such data in order to tailor unique direct messages and marketing campaigns to individual consumers.332 Even the online gambling
industry makes great use of these techniques for both marketing and
player-tracking purposes. Gambling operators can now use player information to track their spending and behavior, and can create synergies by gleaning from other data sources such as a player’s social
media and geolocation.333 As those in power become more technologically aware, so too will they become more troubled by what they discover if loot boxes continue unchecked.334
The size and scope of the loot box problem is what separates it
from other “surprise mechanics.”335 For example, Kinder Eggs are a
popular chocolate candy that have different collectible toys inside
/perma.cc/T2P5-95XQ] (detailing different communities and videos that are susceptible to radicalization when following YouTube’s algorithm to keep consumer watching videos on the platform); Langvardt, supra note 42, at 141–46 (describing software industry and consulting
companies that seek to make tech and apps more addictive).
330 See generally Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns,
13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43 (2021) (establishing taxonomy and assessing gradations of dark patterns in various online and digital marketplaces).
331 See Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J. Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan
Mayer, Marshini Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of
11k Shopping Websites, PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, Nov. 2019, at 81:1, 81:2
(citing Press Release, Deb Fisher, U.S. Sen. for Neb., Senators Introduce Bipartisan Legislation
to Ban Manipulative ‘Dark Patterns’ (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.fischer.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/4/senators-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-ban-manipulative-dark-patterns
[https://perma.cc/49Z7-CZ6Z]).
332 GUNTER, supra note 157, at 123.
333 See Griffiths, supra note 27, at 346 (citing Mike Buck, Bookmaking Technology That
Handles High Volume, GAMBLING INSIDER FRIDAY, 5 May 2017).
334 Members of Congress have already sent letters to several major gaming companies inquiring about whether microtransactions and loot boxes comply with American and foreign laws.
See, e.g., Letter from Lori Trahan, Member of Cong., Kathy Castor, Member of Cong., & Edward J. Markey, U.S. Sen., to Robert Kotick, Chief Exec. Officer, Activision Blizzard Inc. (Aug.
10, 2021), https://trahan.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_game_letters_-_combined.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PL5D-HXCU].
335 See Jamie Madigan, What the Heck Are Surprise Mechanics?, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2019,
8:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiemadigan/2019/08/19/what-the-heck-are-surprisemechanics/ [https://perma.cc/Z6Z4-MF59] (explaining surprise mechanics in video games by
comparing them to other products that have a randomized treat or prize).
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each chocolate egg; McDonald’s Happy Meals offer toys with every
meal; and as previously discussed, Pokémon and sports trading cards
continue to sell physical card packs to children with tiers of rare and
valuable cards inside.336 At their root, these everyday products entice
children and their parents to buy a product with the hope of getting a
coveted prize without knowing what prize they will get. There are indeed many anecdotes337 that suggest these surprise mechanics in nongaming industries are also problematic and should be regulated as
gambling.
So, should these surprise mechanic products deserve the same
regulatory attention as loot boxes? There are several reasons why the
answer, at least at this point, should be no. First, these products lack
sufficient market size, scope, and evidence that justifies such regulation. There are too few reliable studies conducted on these practices,338 and the millions at stake in these industries339 are relatively
small when compared to the billions at stake with loot boxes.340 This is
not meant to diminish the potential problems cited in these other surprise mechanic products, but only to diminish any comparison with
the size, scope, and evidentiary wealth that justifies the regulatory attention for loot boxes. Second, loot boxes are materially different than
Kinder Eggs or Happy Meals in presentation. There is a long line of
research in both animal and human studies that various ranges of
stimuli can reinforce, incentivize, and even change one’s prefer336

See Halbfinger, supra note 182 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Jennifer Warren, My Kid Stole a Kinder Egg. I Tried to Make it a Teachable
Moment. It Didn’t Go Well, CBC (Oct. 21, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/radio/docproject/
kinder-surprise-1.5320982/my-kid-stole-a-kinder-egg-i-tried-to-make-it-a-teachable-moment-itdidn-t-go-well-1.5320986 [https://perma.cc/D4LB-D27Q] (detailing story of a child stealing
Kinder Eggs for the prizes inside); Leigh Alexander, Inside the Strange and Slightly Creepy
World of ‘Surprise Egg’ Videos, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 29, 2016), https://nymag.com/
intelligencer/2016/04/inside-the-world-of-the-surprise-egg-videos-that-kids-love-more-thancartoons.html [https://perma.cc/Q3J9-UGFQ] (discussing popularity of videos showing opening
of Kinder Eggs to reveal prize inside).
337

338 In fact, most serious academic inquiries that mention Kinder Eggs are papers studying
loot boxes. See, e.g., Abarbanel, supra note 318, at 232; Nielsen & Grabarczyk, supra note 33, at
176. In these contexts, Kinder Eggs are only referenced as a similar product.
339 See Alyse Thompson, Kinder Brand Seeing Success in U.S. Confectionery Market,
CANDY INDUS. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.candyindustry.com/articles/88889-kinder-brand-seeing-success-in-us-confectionery-market [https://perma.cc/JWX9-VD7V] (tracking $200 million
success of Kinder Joy brand product); Bill Shea, How the Billion-Dollar Sports Card Industry
Collapsed and then Rebounded, ATHLETIC (May 20, 2020), https://theathletic.com/1812753/2020/
05/20/how-the-billion-dollar-sports-card-industry-collapsed-and-then-rebounded/ [https://
perma.cc/RFN2-J5W8] (tracking collapse of $80 billion sports card industry).
340

See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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ences.341 The stimuli of sounds, flashing colors, and computer generated texts and effects of loot boxes are similar to that of slot machines
and other virtualized forms of gambling.342 Although other surprise
mechanic products may also mimic these celebratory effects to increase dopamine reward centers in the brain, they are a far cry from
the visual and auditory deluge that are meticulously designed by gambling experts to increase spending.343 Finally, loot boxes and other virtual gambling platforms benefit from real-time data that other
surprise mechanic products do not. Loot boxes may benefit from using
big data collected from the buying habits and responses of consumers,
and can use that data to perfect just the right amount of stimuli, pricing, and other factors to increase profits and maximize user experience.344 While the marketing teams of the trading card industry,
McDonalds, and Kinder Eggs are incredibly robust and talented, they
cannot compete with the algorithms produced by real-time big data
that make loot boxes that much more addicting.
This is the double-edged sword of regulating emerging technology: big data is used to bolster the expansion of the technology, but it
can also be used to study and regulate that same technology. Undoubtedly, there is tremendous amounts of data from decades of sales
of Kinder Eggs or trading cards, but it is not as readily accessible to
researchers seeking to find correlations between these sales and problem gambling behavior. And if these problems are supported by sufficient and persuasive evidence, then they should be properly regulated.
With loot boxes, however, reliable data exists that has helped researchers uncover many of the troubling findings outlined in Part
III.345 Use of this data might lead to the ironic result that emerging
technologies are regulated faster than older practices that have been
around for decades, but there is nothing particularly problematic
about that. Emerging technology benefits from the use of big data to
sell, target, and sometimes exploit consumers.346 So too should that
341 See, e.g. Calvin Bierley, Frances K. McSweeney & Renee Vannieuwkerk, Classical Conditioning of Preferences for Stimuli, 12 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 316, 317 (1985) (showing that visual
and auditory stimuli can condition people’s choices when choosing between multiple arbitrary
items); George T. Taylor, Stimulus Change and Complexity in Exploratory Behavior, 2 ANIMAL
LEARNING & BEHAV. 115, 115 (1974) (showing effects of physical stimuli to change animal
behavior).
342

See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.

343

See id.

344

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

345

See supra Part III.

346

See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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same data be used to study and mitigate potential social harms being
caused by that technology.
A second step toward regulation is that there must be proper balancing of interests, which promotes efficiency. An ideal framework
will recognize that the potential costs of a regulation should not outweigh the benefits.347 An overly burdensome framework might regulate an industry out of business or significantly cut into profits, which
can result in losses of tax revenue, jobs, goods and services, and a host
of other direct or indirect costs.348 This is especially delicate when
dealing with emerging and growing industries; regulation should not
be so burdensome as to stifle research and development for future
innovation.349 In the context of loot boxes, the video game industry
has tremendous economic interests at stake and relies on loot box revenues to usher in the next generation of growth.350 This must be balanced, however, with the benefits to society, which is to lessen the
emerging harms that have manifested from loot box behavior.351 Society has long recognized that gambling activity should be regulated according to this balancing of interests,352 and loot boxes should be no
different. Therefore, allowing loot boxes to be sold under tailored regulatory tools is ideal.
A third step toward regulation is that there must actually be a
way to solve or mitigate the problem, which promotes efficacy. Regulatory tools are often necessary when the normal market behavior of
rational economic actors cannot solve the problem absent intervention.353 For instance, if there is a poorly designed product on the market, consumers will act rationally by not supporting the product, which
347 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 39, 1996) (applying cost-benefit analysis when designing regulatory tools); see also
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1073, 1097–98 (2018) (recognizing need for sorting mechanism to balance benefits of deterring dangerous behavior with costs of impeding market growth).
348 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 L. INNOVATION &
TECH. 75, 82 (2009) (“Excessive regulation could limit the development of an extremely promising technology and foreclose potentially great social, health, environmental and economic
benefits.”).
349 See id.
350 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
351 See supra Section III.C.
352 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 31–32.
353 See generally Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (describing the “public interest” theory of regulation, in which regulations are imposed by government to correct market failures, and contrasting this with the “capture” theory where regulations are formed according to interest group politics). This market selfcorrection, which accounts for the market reaching equilibrium on its own, might also be consid-
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would result in discounting prices to match demand or the product
being taken off the market due to lack of demand. When a product
like loot boxes, however, is specifically designed to induce compulsive
or addictive spending to the point that it actually targets problem
spenders, normal market behavior by rational actors will not impact
the viability of the addictive product because only a small niche consumer base can create a profit.354 Market segmentation would ensure
this.355 A shocking 2% of mobile players account for 90% of virtual
item revenue.356 In other words, even if 98% of gamers repudiated the
practice of loot boxes,357 there would still be enough of a market left
to reap large profits from the addictive product of loot boxes.
If loot boxes are a problem, they require an effective solution
that can deliver on the stated goals of the proposed regulation. This is
a high burden to meet to show that there are effective tools that can
properly mitigate the social harms of this gambling activity.
B. Building the Tools: Virtual Regulations for a Virtual World
As gambling experts have acknowledged, there are many tools
that can be used to control the complex social, psychological, and ecoered under the second factor because these market mechanisms would be more efficient than
costs spent on designing and enforcing regulatory tools.
354 Economists have proposed differing views on how to classify addiction within rational
choice economic theory. Compare LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 33 (discussing addiction as “a big contributor to economic irrationality” and the differences between stated
and revealed preferences), with Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational
Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 694–95 (1988) (arguing that addicts are rational actors who
pursue their preferences for gratification through their addiction).
355 See MICHEL WEDEL & WAGNER A. KAMAKURA, MARKET SEGMENTATION: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 3 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining market segmentation
as realization that a heterogeneous market is actually made up of smaller homogeneous segments of consumers that have differing preferences); Byron M. Huang, Walking the Thirteenth
Floor: The Taxation of Virtual Economies, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH 224, 234–36 (2015) (recognizing
that different segments of gamers spend different amounts of money depending on their preferences to earn virtual goods through the work-to-reward ratio or skip the process and buy the
goods).
356 See Andrei Klubnikin, Microtransactions in Games: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
GAMEANALYTICS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://gameanalytics.com/blog/microtransactions-gamesgood-bad-ugly/ [https://perma.cc/F2TC-Z9YE]; Paul Tassi, Why It’s Scary When 0.15% Mobile
Gamers Bring in 50% of the Revenue, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2014, 4:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/insertcoin/2014/03/01/why-its-scary-when-0-15-mobile-gamers-bring-in-50-of-the-revenue/
[https://perma.cc/G53Y-A7VG].
357 See, e.g., Joel Hruska, Most Gamers Hate Buying Loot Boxes, So Why Are Games Using
Them?, EXTREME TECH (Oct. 13, 2017, 1:02 PM), https://www.extremetech.com/gaming/257387gamers-hate-buying-loot-boxes-games-using [https://perma.cc/3CT9-LU29] (describing consensus that most players do not like paying for loot boxes).
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nomic conditions that create the demand for gambling activities.358
But the virtual nature of loot boxes make them too different from
traditional gambling activities to simply apply old gambling regulations to new technology. Instead, many gambling regulations can be
modified to apply effectively to loot boxes without imposing an undue
burden on the video game industry.
This Section proceeds under the assumption that the regulatory
relationship between the video game industry and the government will
be cooperative. It is unlikely that the video game industry can successfully self-regulate given its long history of only proposing self-regulatory tools when pressured by government regulators.359 Collaborating
on regulatory tools would have the benefit of ensuring proper balancing between the parties negotiating their adverse interests and would
heighten efficacy due to the expertise offered by the industry. In addition, regulators simply would not be able to keep up with the industry
on their own because it grows more advanced every year.360 This explains why the government cannot be fully trusted to effectively regulate loot boxes, and why the industry cannot be fully trusted to
effectively self-regulate the same.
1. Virtual Age Verification
One of the first things this partnership between the video game
industry and Congress can do is to ensure that children do not have
access to loot boxes. The mere rating and labeling of games according
to age appropriateness is not effective.361 Instead, age limits enforced
through verification—a bedrock principle of gambling regulation—
that can be properly modified for loot boxes in virtual worlds would
be more effective.362 Admittedly, age verification in cyberspace is
358 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 32 (recognizing need for multiple interventions based
on multiple factors that underpin gambling behavior).
359 See, e.g., HANSEN, supra note 311, at 106 (describing self-regulation of the industry in
shadow of congressional hearings investigating violence in video games).
360 See Gary E. Marchant, Douglas J. Sylvester & Kenneth W. Abbott, What Does the
History of Technology Regulation Teach Us About Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724,
726–27 (2009) (arguing for adaptive regulatory approaches due to speed of technological advancements and relatively slower legislative and regulatory process).
361 See generally Lisa A. Robinson, W. Kip Viscusi & Richard Zeckhauser, Consumer
Warning Labels Aren’t Working, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/consumer-warning-labels-arent-working [https://perma.cc/6C4Y-WF5V] (finding that warning labels
alone are ineffective to deter or warn consumers about risks associated with products).
362 See generally COMM. ON THE SOC. & ECON. IMPACT OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING,
Nat’l RSCH. COUNCIL, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A CRITICAL REVIEW 283–84 (1999) (listing
the age restrictions on gambling activity in each state).
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much more difficult than at a physical casino because children can
easily lie about their age on the internet and access a host of content
that is not age-appropriate.363 Nevertheless, advanced technology can
solve this problem with a bit of ingenuity.
Asking an online consumer to check a box or fill in their age is no
longer enough, but effective resolutions might include real-time credit
checks, bank account pin verification before purchases, voice verification, FaceTime or other streaming facial recognition software, and
even 48-hour waiting periods to verify employment to ensure both age
and financial ability to engage in loot box spending.364 Financial verification tools might prove to be more cumbersome, and consumers
would have to agree to these invasive credit and employment checks
through EULAs. Nevertheless, they would be effective at weeding out
minors, unless the minor was using fraudulent techniques to beat a
credit, income, or employment check.365 The physical verification tools
might prove more efficient because smart phones, gaming consoles,
and personal computers already have the necessary hardware, such as
cameras and microphones, to enable face and voice recognition. In
fact, many of these security software capabilities are already being
perfected on all the same technologies that gamers use to access virtual worlds and loot boxes.366
Age verification should also have an impact on in-game advertisements. If a player has not passed an age verification test, the game
should not advertise loot boxes to them in the virtual world. Neither
should promotional materials be sent to this player’s virtual account
or email. Similar to how the traditional gambling industry limits advertising to limit exposure to children,367 the same should be implemented in virtual worlds so as to not trigger a child’s curiosity. And
363 See, e.g., GUNTER, supra note 157, at 11 (documenting the failure of age-verification
software to prevent children from accessing online gambling).
364 See Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next Millennium: A Look into the Proposed
Ban on Internet Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 443 (2000) (describing model
regulations that require several age verification techniques such as credit checks, voice verification, and bank record checking).
365 See VICTORIA NASH, RACHEL O’CONNELL, BENDERT ZEVENBERGEN & ALLISON
MISHKIN, EFFECTIVE AGE VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES: LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE ONLINE GAMBLING INDUSTRY 21, 26–30 (2013).
366 See, e.g., Raul Garcia-Martin & Raul Sanchez-Reillo, Vein Biometric Recognition on a
Smartphone, 8 IEEE ACCESS 104801, 104801 (2020), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.
jsp?tp=&arnumber=9108276 [https://perma.cc/7XSR-KZP6] (describing advances in biometrics
in smartphones such as facial and voice recognition).
367 See RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 221, at 4 (stating that states may impose advertising restrictions prohibiting advertising that targets minors).
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with existing loot box advertising campaigns—which include advertising in children’s toys magazines368—tying age verification to loot box
advertising in virtual worlds would be a good place to start.
Using age verification tools to protect children will undoubtedly
raise the responsibility of parents in these regulatory debates. After
all, why should the government regulate what parents can supervise?
Following this logic, it might be more efficient to dedicate the same
amount of resources that would be used to fund these regulations to
instead educate parents and children about loot boxes.369 Research
shows, however, that such educational campaigns may not be effective.370 Parents simply do not pay close enough attention to their children’s gaming habits. And how can they? Should they be expected to
physically look over their child’s shoulder for entire play sessions?
And even more problematic is that parents do not understand the
need to supervise their children because they do not appreciate the
potential financial and psychological harm of loot boxes.371 Parents do
indeed bear much responsibility for monitoring their children,372 but
dealing with these powerful technologies requires more than a Puritan
lecture on good parenting and self-control.373 This is especially true
when these technologies are used to specifically target children and
can even override the cognitive safeguards of rationale adults.
2. Virtual Spending Limits
Another set of tools are those that help players track and limit
their spending in real time. As noted above, this is contrary to loot
box design because developers profit from disassociating real money
from virtual tokens.374 The current design serves the purpose of ensuring that players will not be able to track their real-money spending,
which in turn maximizes developer profits.375 Allowing players to
368 See, e.g., Blake, supra note 291 (describing ads in European toy catalogue encouraging
children to buy FIFA card packs).
369 See, e.g., GUNTER, supra note 157, at 125.
370 See id. at 143.
371 See FTC Workshop, supra note 70; Robert Ladouceur, Christian Jacques, Francine Ferland & Isabelle Giroux, Parents’ Attitudes and Knowledge Regarding Gambling Among Youths,
14 J. GAMBLING STUD. 83, 83–90 (1998).
372 See Abarbanel, supra note 318, at 233 (acknowledging responsibility of parents as one
of many actors that must take responsibility in solving spending problems in virtual worlds).
373 The gambling industry has historically made similar arguments that they cannot be held
responsible for consumers’ lack of self-control. See NATASHA DOW SCHÜLL, ADDICTION BY
DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING IN LAS VEGAS 17–18 (2012).
374 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
375 See id.
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track in real time how much real-world money they have spent has
been shown to mitigate overspending by problem gamblers, who actually want to be able to keep track of their losses.376
This is closely related to a spending-limit tool, in which players
can set spending limits at the beginning of every play session. If these
players wanted to later spend above that limit, they would have to go
through several burdensome security settings, or even be cut off for a
cool-down period of an hour or more to dissipate any dopamine or
adrenaline rush that is so often associated with impulsive gambling
behavior.377 One study of an online gambling outlet showed that only
0.3% of problem gamblers exceeded spending limits they set for themselves.378 FIFA developers also recently instituted a similar spending
limit tool that allows players to set weekly limits and track spending,
but the tool only tracks or limits spending of virtual coins.379 Once
again, these self-regulatory tools proposed by the industry are rarely
effective because this still disassociates players from accurately tracking and limiting real-world money spending.
Spending notifications and spending limits can also benefit from
partnering with online payment middlemen, such as Paypal or credit
card companies. These companies facilitate online transactions and
are often linked with players’ mobile phone and online accounts.380 It
is already required that gambling operators issue transaction codes
that include a gaming merchant category, so gambling transactions
can be easily identified and categorized by these payment companies.381 Additionally, these companies already have sophisticated tools
to notify their customers of potential fraud, suspicious account activity, and can even decline to facilitate transactions in real time to protect against potential fraudulent transactions.382 Partnering with these
376 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 25; accord Michael Auer, Sigrun Høvik Reiestad &
Mark D. Griffiths, Global Limit Setting as a Responsible Gambling Tool: What Do Players
Think?, 18 INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION 14, 16 (2020) (reviewing gambling literature
and finding consensus that player-set limits are overwhelmingly supported by gamblers).
377 CYNTHIA LUCAR, JAMIE WIEBE & KAHLIL PHILANDER, MONETARY LIMITS TOOLS FOR
INTERNET GAMBLERS: A REVIEW OF THEIR AVAILABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS ONLINE 39-42 (2013).
378 See GUNTER, supra note 157, at 129 (citing efforts of bwin Interactive Entertainment).
379 See Wesley Yin-Poole, FIFA 21 Will Soon Let You Track and Set Limits on How Many
FIFA Points You Buy from the In-Game Store, EUROGAMER (Nov. 12, 2020), https://
www.eurogamer.net/articles/2020-11-12-fifa-21-will-soon-let-you-impose-strict-limits-on-theamount-you-play-and-spend [https://perma.cc/L5L2-LU3D].
380 See Parke & Griffiths, supra note 313, at 296.
381 See id. at 297–98.
382 See Masoumeh Zareapoor & Pourya Shamsolmoali, Application of Credit Card Fraud
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companies to expand their review of suspicious activity, or to limit
spending, could be a useful step. Gambling research has shown that
partnerships between gambling providers and payment companies are
effective at reducing overexpenditures associated with gambling.383
And researchers have expressed optimism that such spending-limit
tools could be effective for loot boxes.384
3. AI Targeting to Release Whales
Another effective regulation tool might be a novel repurposing of
AI targeting. Currently, AI is being used predatorily to identify high
spenders and “whales” based on their in-game spending habits with
near 87% accuracy.385
Developers use this data to “manipulate the nature and presentation of loot boxes to maximize the likelihood of players making
purchases.”386 This very same AI being used against problem gamblers
for their exploitation could be repurposed for their protection. By flipping the switch the other way, these incredibly powerful and accurate
AI tools could be used to flag players who exhibit problem-gambling
or problem-spending behavior.387 And instead of customizing
gameplay to extract maximum revenue from these players, developers
could instead customize gameplay by cutting these players off, offering customized notifications of spending habits, or imposing other
spending limits like those mentioned in the preceding Section.388
These AI tools already exist for the dark purpose of identifying
and taking advantage of players’ psychological weaknesses. Not only
would these tools be efficient and uncostly to repurpose, but society
would benefit from their ever-increasing accuracy. Developers could
then combine the various tools to help players set spending limits or
give real-time spending data to players that exhibit these problem
Detection: Based on Bagging Ensemble Classifier, 48 PROCEDIA COMPUT. SCI. 679, 680 (2015)
(describing various methods used to detect credit card fraud and other suspicious activity).
383 See Jinghui (Jove) Hou, Keehyung Kim, Sung S. Kim & Xiao Ma, Disrupting Unwanted
Habits in Online Gambling Through Information Technology, 36 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 1213, 1223
(2019) (describing novel use of information technology tools, such as limiting use of credit cards,
to combat problem gambling).
384 See Drummond et al., supra note 304, at 935.
385 See Walker, supra note 27. The gambling industry also employs sophisticated data technology to extract money from high spenders online. See Griffiths, supra note 27, at 346.
386 See AUSTL. SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 34.
387 See Langvardt, supra note 42, at 129–30 (arguing that software can be used to monitor
consumers using technology to help prevent overuse or burnout).
388 Cf. GUNTER, supra note 157, at 123 (noting that online databases for shopping websites
collect customer data to tailor unique direct messages and marketing campaigns).
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spending behaviors. And while targeting and limiting the spending of
these so-called “whales” would significantly cut into developer revenues, it would also ensure that players do not burn out, which has
been proven to increase return customers.389
4. Real-World Pigouvian Taxation
Another interesting intervention is that of a government-issued
Pigouvian tax to help offset the negative externalities caused by loot
boxes.390 Consumers would not be restricted from buying loot boxes
but would have to pay an additional surcharge collected by developers, who would then pass this tax to the government. The added cost
might dissuade players from buying loot boxes or reduce their profitability, and those that do buy loot boxes would be contributing to a
government fund that could offset harms.391 In an alternative or overlapping model, the government could simply tax the developers directly, which holds them directly responsible for their contribution to
the social harms that loot boxes cause.392 Although developers might
pass on those costs to players, the result would likely be similar; the
added costs would dissuade some from buying loot boxes and would
make them less profitable.
There are a few worthy programs into which the government
could invest this newfound revenue. The government could award
grants to establish rehab centers for those who exhibit addictive or
problematic gambling behavior due to loot boxes.393 These programs
could be successfully managed as outpatient programs and could even
be run virtually. The government could also invest in academic and
independent research, awarding grants to social scientists, engineers,
389 See Langvardt, supra note 42, at 154 (describing technologies used by gambling industry
to prevent customer burnout to build and maintain lifelong return customers).
390 See Anton Korinek, Taxation and the Vanishing Labor Market in the Age of AI, 16
OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 244, 252 (2020) (explaining societal goals of Pigouvian taxation).
391 See Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1642 (2006) (describing imposition of taxes on
certain items to discourage consumers from buying them).
392 Cf. LEHDONVIRTA & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 144 (citing examples of bars and
liquor stores only paying a small part of the true social costs associated with alcohol
consumption).
393 Rehab centers for gaming addiction already exist in countries like South Korea. See
Melia Robinson, Korea’s Internet Addiction Crisis Is Getting Worse, as Teens Spend up to 88
Hours a Week Gaming, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 25, 2015, 9:37 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-online-gaming-addiction-rehab-centers-2015-3 [https://
perma.cc/LM78-UXBZ].
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and others to dive deeper into the loot box problem to continue to
innovate policy for the next generation of loot boxes.394
This Part’s brief foray exploring regulatory tools tailored to mitigate the social harms of loot boxes only scratches the surface and is
not meant to be exhaustive.395 Designing effective regulation requires
carefully exploring many considerations, which are best handled
through transparent partnerships between the video game industry
and the government.396 But to do nothing, as the United States has, is
sending the wrong signal.397 By combining extensive research from the
gambling industry and virtual worlds, the tools detailed above can
strike the right balance to protect children, problem gamblers, and
other indulgent consumers while allowing developers to continue selling loot boxes responsibly and profitably.
V. EXPANDING VIRTUAL VALUE
This Article’s contribution of perceived virtual valuation can and
should be an important policy tool for the future of the virtual world.
So far, this Article has focused on using the new virtual valuation tools
offered by perceived value to argue why loot boxes should be regulated as a gambling activity and what such regulations might look like.
But analyzing loot boxes is only one of many applications perceived
virtual value can have in law and policy. The goal of this Part is not to
exhaust the potential of perceived virtual value, but instead to start a
scholarly conversation about the many effects it can have in the real
and virtual world.
An opening consideration is from the perspective of an investor.
If virtual worlds were classified merely as colorful, creative, and imag394 See, e.g., Haydn Taylor, Parliamentary Committee Recommends Banning Loot Box Sales
to Children, GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/201909-11-parliamentary-committee-recommends-banning-loot-box-sales-to-children [https://
perma.cc/5Q27-BKFZ] (reporting that the United Kingdom’s Committee on Digital Culture,
Media and Sport proposed a similar Pigouvian tax on developers to fund further research into
the effects of loot boxes and its links to problem gambling behavior).
395 See, e.g., ALEX BLASZCZYNSKI, AUST. GAMING COUNCIL, HARM MINIMIZATION STRATEGIES IN GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES & INTERVENTIONS 6–7
(2003), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239548997_Harm_minimization_strategies_in_
gambling_An_overview_of_international_initiatives_interventions [https://perma.cc/Q9WEUTJV] (outlining dozens of regulatory interventions commonly employed to limit gambling
activity).
396 See Abarbanel, supra note 318, at 234 (“The rapid evolution of technology vastly outpaces research and empirical evidence of its impacts . . . .”).
397 See Michael Kirby, The Fundamental Problem of Regulating Technology, 5 INDIAN J.L.
& TECH. 1, 13 (2009) (stating that doing nothing when confronting rapidly expanding emerging
technologies is to make a decision).
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inative deposit boxes, the valuation of virtual goods would necessarily
permeate all aspects of our financial lives. Might investors start parking money in these virtual worlds? This is incredibly unlikely given the
EULAs currently in place. Virtual goods are not appreciating assets,
but instead their value fluctuates on the whims of developers who can
adjust their artificial scarcity with a few keystrokes.398 This Article argues that it is actually more likely that virtual goods would depreciate
with time. While they do not degrade physically, new virtual goods,
games, and updates constantly flood the virtual world so as not to
make any virtual good particularly valuable, as is an investment holding. There are, of course, exceptions. Star Citizen is a video game that
has made headlines for the millions of dollars it has raised from
crowdfunding, with some contributors spending tens of thousands of
dollars to buy expensive virtual spaceships.399 One of the most expensive virtual goods ever sold was an entire virtual planet for a reported
$6 million.400 But these investments are far too risky and offer little
control to investors. At any point, developers could shutter the game
or amend the virtual world in a way that renders the virtual goods
within worthless. Further, there are only a minority of people buying
such assets for investment purposes; rather, most big spenders are not
investors seeking pecuniary gain, but gamers seeking virtual perceived
value.401
Another set of considerations relates to criminal law and other
areas of law that seek to assign liability for wrongdoing. For example,
popular video game marketplaces have already been exploited by
criminals to launder their money through buying and exchanging virtual goods with and through other players.402 Given that the unregulated space of virtual value in these games has become a haven for
money laundering, it is not far-fetched to expect to see an expansion
of this type of behavior. Could virtual assets become the new tax
havens of the future? Could buying virtual assets be a new strategy for
See supra Section I.A.
See, e.g., Tyler Wilde, Meet a Fan Who Has Spent $30,000 on Star Citizen Ships, PCGAMER (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.pcgamer.com/meet-a-fan-who-has-spent-30000-on-star-citizen-ships/ [https://perma.cc/9JYC-MA4V] (interviewing man spending tens of thousands on
virtual spaceships).
400 Most Expensive Virtual Items in Video Games, SUCCESSSTORY, https://successstory.com/
spendit/most-expensive-virtual-items-in-video-games [https://perma.cc/5G75-LNHE] (documenting several expensive virtual purchases, including a virtual planet purchased for $6 million).
401 See, e.g., Walker, supra note 27; Wilde, supra note 399.
402 See John Paul Kong, In-Game Virtual Items as a Form of Criminal Money, MONEYNESS
(Nov. 28, 2019), jpkoning.blogspot.com/2019/11/in-game-virtual-items-as-form-of.html [https://
perma.cc/V5T8-U2MY].
398
399
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people to hide assets and become judgment proof? Could virtual assets even become a part of an investment strategy in diversifying portfolios? All of these questions, hopefully, will not go unanswered in the
future if regulators take the responsible approach in properly assessing virtual value not only as it relates to the real world, but also it
relates to the virtual world.
Criminal law might have to expand as well to punish hackers who
unlawfully access player accounts and steal virtual goods; not only
could they be prosecuted for violating cybercrime laws, but also for
violating laws that protect personal property.403 And the difference
between theft and grand theft of virtual goods might be determined
based on the real-world value of the goods on a primary or secondary
market. Torts such as conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress might also serve as appropriate remedies given the psychological distress that could be caused by the perceived value of
virtual goods. These expansions into criminal and tort law are not particularly worrying.
Although adding even more potential charges—like that of virtual burglary and/or hacking—to existing criminal acts is troubling, it
might be most appropriate if the penalty for virtual burglary was a
fine or another penalty of a restorative nature to ensure that the victim recovered the virtual good or its commensurate real-money’s
worth. In addition, these added methods of accountability might serve
to deter some cybercriminals if their crimes would be subject to these
additional penalties. This would undoubtedly require yet another
partnership between government and industry, with game developers
assisting in law enforcement investigations of such crimes. Not all developers will be so willing,404 but cooperation with law enforcement in
most cases will help developers’ bottom line by keeping their lawabiding virtual citizens happy and their accounts safe.
The law of debtors might also need to grapple with virtual valuation if virtual goods were to be considered assets of an estate. Bankruptcy courts would have to valuate virtual assets in personal
bankruptcy cases and how to best divide these assets to repay credi403 See generally Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 50 (acknowledging the contrast between
holding cybercriminals accountable under hacking laws, and applying traditional criminal laws
against virtual persons).
404 For example, companies may assert privacy protections to resist cooperating with law
enforcement. See, e.g., Arjun Kharpal, Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar. 29,
2016, 10:54 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html
[https://perma.cc/N7QR-Z2RW] (detailing Apple’s refusal to help unlock iPhones connected
with criminal activity).
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tors. And on the other side of bankruptcy, if a developer filed for
bankruptcy and wished to wind down their business, a court might
have to take control and manage their virtual world because the developer would have fiduciary duties to protect and maintain virtual
assets under its care.405 Family law courts might have to start considering virtual assets when determining terms of separation, alimony payments, and child support.406 These family law considerations would
also implicate wills and trusts in passing on virtual assets of value to
the next generation. Even the perceived value of virtual family heirlooms could be in play.
Government benefits may also be affected if virtual wealth offsets
real-world poverty. For students applying for need-based government
loans, valuable virtual goods that would count toward their total net
worth could affect their eligibility. The same might be true for other
need-based government programs, such as welfare.
From a value theory perspective, none of these potential expansions of how the real-world processes value is problematic for perceived virtual value. Real-world parties and institutions would only be
concerned with assessing real-world value because they would only be
concerned with determining real-world wealth to count or divide assets, or to determine eligibility for programs. Consequently, many of
these real-world considerations are irrelevant to the perceived value
of virtual goods. Real-world markets will continue to determine the
real-world value of virtual goods; perceived virtual value will continue
to determine the virtual value of virtual goods. The two value constructs are not related and do not overlap, so accounting for perceived
virtual value is unlikely to create unintended consequences in the real
world.
This is not to say that perceived virtual value would have a small
impact on the real world; rather, it would have a large impact in any
situation in which emotional or psychological attachments to assets
are being considered. If a virtual good is stolen or damaged, the emotional or psychological damage caused can be measured in part and
justified by perceived virtual value. Perceived virtual value could also
play a role as a negotiation strategy. Debtors might have tremendous
emotional, social, and other valuable attachments to a car, a house, or
405 See Balkin, supra note 47, at 96 (contemplating bankruptcy of virtual world game
developers).
406 See Bradley & Froomkin, supra note 49, at 232–39 (briefly exploring transplanting legal
rules into the virtual world from disciplines of property, tax, transactions, family law, administrative law to name a few).
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a family heirloom. The same might be true in the family court context
or in the division of an estate. These proceedings are always subject to
negotiation with adverse parties; if the adverse party agrees to leave
certain assets alone, that is their right to forfeit. So too should this be
true for the perceived value that some may have in virtual goods.
However, strategic parties could also target virtual goods that have
significant virtual value in order to sway negotiations and pressure
concessions in other parts of the estate.
Switching back to real-world value, a more robust treatment of
virtual goods in the real world should not bring burdensome change.
First, it is unlikely that any court or institution would count virtual
goods as part of a portfolio of assets because of the question of ownership. EULAs prevent players from owning these virtual goods, and
any unauthorized sale or transfer of these virtual goods is a violation
of this private contract.407 From a legal perspective, few if any institutions would force players to liquidate or be held responsible for the
value of such assets if they have no ownership, or if such a liquidation
ordered by the court would in turn violate a valid contract.
Second, even if the future birthed a quasi-ownership regime for
virtual goods, there is little reason to treat virtual goods differently
from real-world goods. As virtual goods become more commodified,
players benefit. They would be able to sell their coveted virtual goods
in primary and secondary marketplaces if they wanted extra income
or needed it on a rainy day. These virtual goods need not be taxed on
an ongoing basis, other than perhaps sales tax at the point of acquisition, which is like most chattel properties. And like chattel properties,
they might only be taxed upon resale because they generated an income over a de minimus amount.408 In addition, chattel properties can
be divided as assets according to their resale value in divorce proceedings, but are usually not taken into account when determining things
like child support and alimony, which is income-based.409 Virtual
goods would be treated similarly in other income-based assessments,
407 See Lehdonvirta & CASTRONOVA, supra note 60, at 76 (describing ownership limitations
in EULAs).

See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
See Ira M. Ellman & Sanford L. Braver, Lay Intuitions About Child Support and Marital
Status, 23 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 465, 468–69 (2011) (explaining framework of determining child
support and alimony based, in part, on income); Kelly Frawley & Emily Pollock, Alimony and
Child Support: What Judges Consider About Your Income, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2019, 2:27 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/frawleypollock/2019/04/30/alimony-and-child-support-what-judgesconsider-about-your-income/ [https://perma.cc/5YXK-LHFB] (providing overview of income
subject to most states’ child support and alimony decisions).
408
409
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such as eligibility for loans, social services, and unemployment; regardless of chattel holdings, these need-based programs do not require families to sell everything they have as an exhaustion
requirement to become eligible for government programs.
Fundamentally, these concerns of expanding virtual value primarily question effects on real-world wealth based on the assessments of
real-world institutions and interests but do little to undermine the importance of virtual perceived value. Nevertheless, these questions are
interesting thought projects that should be explored by a new renaissance of virtual law scholars studying tax, property, constitutional,
criminal, technology, and a whole host of other implications for the
next generation.
CONCLUSION
It’s inevitable: soon we will all be gamers.
—Rob Fahey410
Soon, we will all hold virtual goods and value them according to
our preferences. The impact of virtual worlds is growing and is beginning to overlap with many aspects of our lives.411 This Article ushers in
a new and unique inquiry in legal scholarship, building on the study of
virtual worlds to apply a new concept of perceived virtual value and
its psychological importance when thinking about the impact that virtual goods have in the real world. When applied to the emerging trend
of loot boxes, this Article has shown that the perceived virtual value
of loot box rewards drives players to take on the same risks and creates the same negative externalities as the gambling industry it
mimics. Because antiquated state gambling laws do not credit how
perceived virtual value drives consumer behavior in virtual worlds,
they have failed to keep pace with the emerging monetization scheme
of loot boxes that so closely resembles an unregulated form of virtual
gambling. By further exploring regulatory tools that update best practices from gambling regulation to apply in the virtual worlds, this Article shows that solving the problem of loot boxes and assessing the
future impact of the perceived value of virtual goods is a game that
everyone can win.

410 MCGONIGAL, supra note 9, at 12 (quoting Rob Fahey, It’s Inevitable: Soon We Will All
Be Gamers, SUNDAY TIMES (July 7, 2008, 1:00 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/its-inevitable-soon-we-will-all-be-gamers-sn0v2p5lfc7 [https://perma.cc/22VH-6DZP]).
411 See id. at 125 (recognizing numerous overlaps between real and virtual worlds).

